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1 Introduction and background 
1.1 Introduction 
“Evangelical Christians in America face a historic opportunity. We make 
up fully one quarter of all voters in the most powerful nation in history. 
Never before has God given American evangelicals such an awesome 
opportunity to shape public policy in ways that could contribute to the well-
being of the entire world. Disengagement is not an option. We must seek 
God’s face for biblical faithfulness and abundant wisdom to rise to this 
unique challenge.” 
– Opening words from “For the Health of the Nation”, policy document 
adopted by National Association of Evangelicals on October 7, 2004. 
  
Americans have always been a religious people and religion has always been a major 
force in United States (U.S.) politics. Still, under President George W. Bush religion 
seems to occupy a more central place in the public space than ever before. Bush’s 
presidency has been called the most openly religious in U.S. history (Smith 2006:365). 
And the so-called Christian Right is fuelling the domestic political debate on issues 
like abortion, same-sex marriage and stem-cell research.  
 
Since the mid 1990s, religious issues have become increasingly visible in the foreign 
policy field as well. Faith-based lobbyists lead by evangelical Christians claim they are 
the main reason why legislation on religious freedom has been passed in Congress; 
why President Bush has increased his aid budget to Africa with 67 percent; and why 
the United States continue to be Israel’s strongest ally, to mention just a few 
examples.1 According to U.S. foreign policy scholar Walter Russell Mead, “the resent 
surge in the number and the power of evangelicals is recasting the country’s political 
scene – with dramatic implications for foreign policy” (Mead 2006).2 Mead’s cover 
story “God’s Country?” in Foreign Affairs is the latest in a growing line of scholarly 
 
1 All examples will be discussed in chapter 1.4. 
2 The quote is taken from the summary of Mead’s article on Foreign Affair’s web page: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85504/walter-russell-mead/god-s-country.html 
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work recognizing the influence of religious conservatives in the making of U.S. 
foreign policy and the fact that this influence stretches beyond abortion and Israel 
(Abrams 2001, Hertzke 2004, Martin 1999, Thomas 2005).3 Although Mead’s claim is 
at least partially a prediction of evangelical influence in the years to come, he also 
refers to several cases where evangelicals are said to have altered U.S. policy priorities 
already. Among these is the peace treaty that ended 23 years of civil war between 
north and south in Sudan in 2005. “Thanks to evangelical pressure, (…) the [United 
States] has led the fight to end Sudan’s wars,” Mead (2006:38) claims.  
 
Are Mead's claims true? Has the recasting of the religious landscape in the U.S. altered 
the country’s foreign policy? And is this evident in U.S. policy towards Sudan? These 
are my research questions. Several studies and press reports have emphasized the deep 
involvement in the peace process in Sudan by the Bush administration as an example 
of the influence of religious conservative lobby groups on the administration's policies 
(Africa Confidential 2001, Bumiller 2003, Connell 2001, Danforth 2006, Hertzke 
2004, Mead 2006, Woodward 2006). But none of these have studied the campaign and 
the policy process in detail.4 The aim of my detailed case study of evangelical 
influence on U.S. Sudan policy is 1) to shed light on how these religiously 
conservative groups worked to influence policy in this particular case; 2) to use the 
case study to make generalizations on evangelical influence on U.S. foreign policy in 
general; and 3) to peek into the 'black box' of foreign policy to discuss to which degree 
domestic politics influence foreign policy. But first; a brief background on the role of 
religion in American politics, the rise and recent revival of the evangelical movement 
 
3 Although not widely covered, mainstream U.S. media has noted this phenomenon in recent years. See Bumiller 
(2003), Cooperman (2006), Economist (2006), Kristof (2002), LaFrinchi (2006), Miller (2006), Totten (2006), 
Waldman (2004).  
4 I have not come over any such studies, anyway. The only exception is political scientist at Oklahoma 
University Allen D.  Hertzke's Freeing God's Children. The problem with Hertzke's book is however that he 
openly admits being a sympathetic insider to the movement, and he does not provide a balanced judgment of the 
actual policy impact of the Sudan campaign. 
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and how this movement has become an influential foreign policy pressure group in 
recent decades.  
 
1.2 Religion and politics in the United States 
The United States is by far the most religious of the world’s developed nations. 
Surveys show 95 percent of all Americans say they believe in God. Around 70 percent 
are members of a church or a synagogue, and around 40 percent attend religious 
services every week – all numbers far beyond most Western European nation (Haynes 
1998). Christianity is by far the largest and most influential religion, and Protestantism 
is the majority faith within Christianity. 
 
The United States was born of religious zeal, and religion has influenced politics 
heavily ever since the first Puritan refugees landed on American shores in the 1600s. 
The religious revival movement of the 1730s and 40s (the Great Awakening) inspired 
the break from England a few years later. Religion was central in the battle over 
slavery in the 1850s: Supporters of the slave system used the Christian faith to pacify 
their slaves, but Christianity also became a vehicle for blacks to organize themselves 
politically and served as motivation for the abolitionists. And since the 1960s, 
religiously motivated battles over issues such as abortion have dominated public 
debate. 
 
There are many more such examples. Major studies on the relationship between 
religion and politics in American history seem to agree on one thing: Religion shapes 
American culture, including its political culture in profound ways (Fowler and Hertzke 
1995, Noll 1990/1992, Ribuffo 2001). The religious heritage from the Puritans and 
evangelicals helps explain the particular American idea of being an exceptional – 
chosen – people with a mission to lead the world, whether it be by spreading their 
values or acting as a moral example (from the ‘city upon a hill’ as the puritan leader 
John Whinthrop famously formulated it). And it helps explain why all American 
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presidents from George Washington to George W. Bush have invoked religious 
rhetoric heavily in their speeches (Judis 2005, Smith 2001).  
 
Religion provides moral “road maps” to leaders (Amstutz 2001:177), guides them in 
the ethical aspects of decisions, and colors the way they view reality. So there seems to 
be little doubt that religion has an indirect impact on politics through the realm of 
ideas. It is more difficult to prove whether religion or religious groups influences 
politics more directly, when religious communities act as foreign policy pressure 
groups. This has happened several times throughout U.S. history, although religious 
historian Leo P. Ribuffo contends that “no major diplomatic decision has turned on 
religious issues alone” (Ribuffo 2001:21). One possible exception is the Israel lobby. 
Ribuffo (ibid:15) notes the quick recognition of Israel by the U.S. in 1948 as “a victory 
for one of the great grassroots lobbying efforts in American history”. And, according 
to a now (in)famous article by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2006) on the 
Israel lobby, “the thrust of US policy in [the Middle East] derives almost entirely from 
domestic politics, and especially the activities of the ‘Israel lobby’”. This lobby 
consists not only of the Jewish community, but also “includes prominent Christian 
evangelicals” (ibid.). The political influence of evangelicals is the subject of this study. 
 
1.3 The rise, fall and revival of the evangelicals 
Evangelicalism is a branch of Protestantism that believes in a literal interpretation of 
the Bible; stresses the importance of converting as an adult (to ‘accept Christ’ and be 
‘born again’); and practices aggressive evangelizing in order to convert non-believers 
(Fowler and Hertzke 1995:14). The Evangelical movement first came into being 
through preachers such as Jonathan Edwards, John Wesley and George Whitefield in 
the early eighteenth century, and quickly became the dominant strain of Protestantism 
in the Puritan New England, where its emphasis on simple biblical preaching in a 
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fervent style seemed to have had especially fertile ground.5 It remained the dominant 
religious force in the U.S. until the beginning of the twentieth century (around 1870-
1920), when broad societal changes (rise of Darwinism, general modernization and 
urbanization) led to a spiritual crisis and a split between religious modernizers and 
conservatives. The modernizers were willing to modify evangelical doctrines to 
remain credible in a modern age. The conservatives wanted to keep their literal belief 
in the doctrines of the Bible. By the 1920s, after the famous Scopes-trial6, many of 
these conservatives had taken the name fundamentalists and largely withdrawn from 
public and political life. Another branch of conservatives chose to stay within the 
mainline denominations. These were called “neo-evangelicals” and later just 
evangelicals. Today, the term “evangelical” is used on any Christian conservative 
enough to affirm the basic beliefs of the old nineteenth-century evangelicalism 
(Marsden 1991:4). This includes fundamentalists, who may be considered a militant 
subgroup of evangelicals – or as the fundamentalist preacher Jerry Falwell likes to put 
it: “A fundamentalist is an evangelical who is angry about something” (ibid:1).  
 
Evangelicals by and large disappeared from the radar screen from the 1920s and their 
sudden re-emergence as a social and political force in the 1970s surprised most 
observers. Today, evangelicals constitute the most numerous and salient religious 
subgroup in the United States. While the number of Christians has grown considerably 
along with the population growth since the 1960s, membership in mainline, liberal 
denominations has dropped sharply: from 29 to 22 million between 1960 and 2003 
(Mead 2006:36). The drop in market share is even more dramatic: In 1960, 25 percent 
of all members of religious groups belonged to one of the seven leading Protestant 
denominations; by 2003, this had dropped to 15 percent (ibid). At the same time, the 
numbers of members in the main evangelical denominations has exploded. The largest, 
 
5 This brief historical overview is based on Marsden (1991), Fowler and Hertzke (1995) and Noll (1992). 
6 John T. Scopes was a young high-school teacher in Tennessee, who was brought to trial by the state for 
breaking the antievolution law by teaching Darwinism in school. The case got enormous attention in the press, 
and the state ultimately lost.  
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the Southern Baptist Convention, has gained more members than the main liberal 
denominations have lost combined. Furthermore, the number of evangelicals or born-
agains within the mainline denominations has increased. Today, a majority of 
Protestants in the States define themselves as evangelicals and they constitute around 
one quarter of the total population in the country – around 75 million people.7  
 
What explains this sudden and dramatic change in the religious landscape? On the 
surface, the rise of religious fundamentalism as a political force is a counter-
revolution. Just as the first rise of fundamentalism was a reaction to the secularization 
of society in the late 1800s, the revival of the religious right in the 1960s started as a 
direct response to events such as the Civil rights movement, the rise of liberal 
counterculture (above all visible in the protests against the Vietnam War) and the 1973 
Supreme Court decision on abortion. Conservative churches promised certainty in 
times of uncertainty; clear, biblical answers to complex societal problems (Marsden 
1991:105). But to understand the rise of the Christian Right, one also has to take into 
account predisposing circumstances in American religion, such as its so-called this-
wordly orientation (what you do in life matters, as opposed to fatalism), its emphasis 
on values and morality and its massive institutional recourses. Conservative church 
leaders capitalized on this in the late 1960s, having built a strong organizational 
network over the past decades, centred around conservative radio networks, TV-
stations, bible groups, think tanks and leadership networks (Wuthnow 1989).  
 
It is important to note that the rise of the Christian Right has not only been an 
Protestant evangelical revival. It is also a movement from the liberal to the more 
conservative strains of all denominations. The main religious cleavage in American 
religion is today no longer between Protestants and Catholics, but between liberals and 
 
7 Estimate made by Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life (2005). But because evangelicals are found in all 
denominations and have a low degree of institutional identity, the estimates vary from 40 to 100 millions, 
depending on how the question is framed in surveys, and by which definition is used. Most estimates are in the 
upper range of this spectrum though. 
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conservatives within all denominations. Likewise, a person’s political behavior is not 
predicted by his denomination, but by whether he is a religious modernist or a 
traditionalist (Green 2004). Several different terms are used to describe the 
conservative branches of all beliefs. In this thesis, I will stay away from the terms 
Christian Right and religious right from now on; since these political terms do not fit 
all the groups I study: There are religious conservatives on the left of American 
politics too; Jim Wallis (2006) is a prominent example. And several of the evangelical 
campaigners on foreign policy label themselves centrists, and not members of the 
Christian Right (Cizik 2007). What these political liberals and conservatives have in 
common however, is a conservative religious belief. Therefore, terms like religious 
conservatives and conservative Christians will be used alternately to describe the faith-
based activists I study. These terms cover evangelical Christians as well as 
conservative Catholics and Jews within the coalition. Still, the revival of conservative 
Protestants (evangelicals) is the main focus of this thesis, and I will also use the term 
evangelical when I describe evangelicals specifically.  
 
1.4 Religious conservatives expand their agenda 
The impact of the shift towards more religious beliefs is not hard to find in domestic 
politics in the United States: Political and judicial battles over issues like abortion, gay 
rights and stem-cell research has been a dominant part of the political landscape since 
the 1970s. A plethora books analyze these “Culture wars”.8 Far less attention has been 
given to the Christian conservative influence on foreign policy.9 One reason might be 
the impact of political realism: The belief that foreign policy to a larger degree than 
 
8 The phrase was made famous by James Davison Hunter’s book Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America 
in 1991. For a good discussion on this topic written by two Englishmen outside the struggle, see Micklethwait 
and Wooldridge (2004). 
9 Whereas the studies on the Christian Right can be counted in the hundreds, I have only come over one 
monograph (Hertzke 2004) and one collection of essays (Abrams 2001) entirely devoted to religious 
conservative’s foreign policy agendas (not including the several books on the Christian Right and Israel, the 
impact of George W. Bush’s personal beliefs and a number of shorter articles).  
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domestic policy is viewed as an area of strategic calculation and national interests. 
Another may be the impact of so-called secularization theory: The belief that religion’s 
impact on public life diminishes as modernization moves forward. However, over the 
past few years religion seems to have been ‘rediscovered’ as part of the foreign policy 
calculus (Abrams 2001, Berger 1999, Hehir et.al. 2004, Thomas 2005).  
 
This thesis rests on the assumptions that domestic politics does affect foreign policy; 
and that religious groups are part of this political debate. A look at the foreign policy 
debate in the United States since the 1980s clearly shows that Christian groups have 
been very visible. Their achievements may be divided into four main areas: 
 
1. Expansion of the domestic agenda. Since the 1980s, religious conservatives have 
taken the battle over abortion, abstention, gay rights and other so-called moral issues 
to the international arena. Conservative Christians campaigned heavily before 
president Reagan launched his “Mexico City”-policy, which decreed that no overseas 
agency that promotes abortion could receive federal assistance from the U.S..10 The 
UN has been a favorite whipping boy, widely considered a corrupt cradle of secular 
ideas – even Anti-Christ in Christian conservative circles.11 But the campaign against 
UN programs and conventions has also meant working within the system of Anti-
Christ, and may have contributed to making the UN more legitimate for many 
conservatives (Butler 2003). 
 
2. New emphasis on foreign aid. Religious conservatives have not only contributed to 
withholding of aid, but also to an increase of U.S. aid to poor countries. Under George 
W. Bush, foreign aid to Africa has risen by 67 percent, including 15 billion dollars in 
new spending to combat HIV/aids (Mead 2006). This is widely attributed to 
 
10 This policy was lifted under President Clinton, but reinstated again under President Bush (Lobe 2002). 
11 In the fiction novel series ”Left Behind”, which has sold 63 million copies since the 1970s, the Secretary 
General of the United Nations is depicted as Anti-Christ.  
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campaigning from evangelical lobby groups, and especially their connections with 
Michael Gerson, himself an evangelical, who was called the social conscience of the 
White House as policy adviser and speechwriter for President Bush (Economist 2005). 
 
3. Strong support for Israel. Numerically, the so-called Israel lobby is not 
predominantly Israeli or Jewish. It is evangelical Christian.12 Evangelicals’ literal 
understanding of Biblical doctrine makes them Israel’s staunchest supporters in the 
United States. The widespread Christian view is that Christians, not Jews represent the 
new and true children of Israel. A majority of evangelicals base their belief on 
prophecies in the Old Testament saying God has given Israel (including the West 
Bank) to the Jews that the Jews will have to occupy the holy land before Christ can 
return.13 They also believe the majority of Jews will turn to Christ just before he 
returns, which reduces the need for conversion to build an alliance between the two 
groups. The exact impact of the evangelical groups on the Israel lobby, and the lobby’s 
impact on U.S. foreign policy is hard to measure. Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) 
nonetheless contend the lobby is the main reason why the United States is Israel’s 
staunchest supporter. 
 
4. Campaign against religious persecution. The latest development within faith-based 
activism in the United States has been a steady campaign to fight persecution of 
Christian minorities in far corners of the world. In the mid-90s, a Congressional lobby 
campaign was developed by a number of highly engaged and well-connected 
individuals in Washington DC think-tanks and within the political wings of 
evangelical denominations.14 Their campaigning and alliances with central lawmakers 
 
12 There are three million Jews in the United States, and 75 million evangelicals.  
13 In a Pew survey from 2003, 62 percent of the evangelicals say “Israel fulfils biblical prophecy about second 
coming”, compared to 36 percent in the population as a whole. 72 percent say God gave land of Israel to the 
Jews, compared to 44 percent of all those surveyed (Pew 2005).   
14 The anatomy of this campaign is described in detail in chapter 4.2. 
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on Capitol Hill seem to have contributed considerably to the signing of five 
Congressional acts:  
 
i) The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 made promotion of religious 
freedom abroad an explicit foreign policy goal for the United States, as one of only 
two countries in the world.15 It established an office within the State Department, an 
ambassador-at-large and an independent commission, all designated to advise the 
government on how countries perform on religious freedom. Countries given poor 
grades can face economic sanctions at the will of the president.  
 
ii) The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 was also motivated by stories of 
how Christian women were enslaved and became victims of sex trade in Muslim 
countries (Hertzke 2004:315-335). It gave the president new measures to sanction 
countries who do not fight trafficking. New legislation signed by President Bush in 
January 2006 will provide an estimated 360 million dollars to fight human trafficking 
(McMahon 2006).16
 
iii) The Sudan Peace Act of 2002 was aimed at pressuring the Muslim regime in 
Khartoum by opening up for direct aid to Christian rebels in the South for the first 
time, and by establishing benchmarks for conduct by Khartoum in the ongoing peace 
negotiations. The benchmarks were accompanied by threats of direct sanctions.  
 
iv) The North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 required president Bush to appoint a 
special envoy for human rights in North Korea and says human rights in the country 
shall be a “key element in future negotiations between the United States, North Korea 
and other concerned parties in Northeast Asia”. Korea has been a major area for 
 
15 The Vatican city-state is the other one (Pew 2006).  
16 These efforts have been noted by the Norwegian newspaper Verdens Gang as well (Skartveit 2007). 
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evangelization for more than a century, and American missionaries estimate 100.000 
Christians are in North Korean jails, persecuted because of their faith (Becker 2003).  
 
v) The Advance Democracy Act of 2005 states that “to promote freedom and 
democracy in foreign countries [shall be] a fundamental component of United States 
foreign policy”. It aims at establishing a new Office of Democratic Movements and 
Transitions in the State department and requires the department to issue an annual 
democracy report. It was introduced by the same group of evangelical politicians and 
pressure groups who initiated the previous four laws (Feffer 2005).  
 
1.5 Saving Sudan 
Together, these achievements may seem to add up to a considerable evangelical 
influence on U.S. foreign policy in recent years. However, there are two major 
problems with making such a conclusion based on such a brief review. First, as 
mentioned in the introduction, no detailed, in-depth case studies have been made to 
investigate and weigh claims of evangelical influence against other explanations for 
U.S. policy. Secondly, these points do not necessarily add up to major changes in the 
direction of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. has always been Israel’s strongest supporter, 
since long before the evangelical revival. The launch of a new 15 billion dollar aid 
program does not mean that the promised increases actually are implemented in the 
end. The fact that the U.S. now has a law on religious persecution does not mean that 
the U.S. aggressively pursues a policy against religious persecution around the world. 
And the fact that human rights according to Congress are supposed to be central in 
U.S. policy towards North Korea does not mean that it is. In fact, the religious lobby 
groups themselves have made several complaints that the laws they have campaigned 
for have yet to make any considerable impact (Horowitz 2007, Fikes 2005, Pew Forum 
2006b).  
 
It might be the case that influence from the new conservative Christians has altered 
U.S. foreign policy. But this case might also be overstated by putting too much 
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emphasis on symbolic policies and Congressional decisions, and too little emphasis on 
implementation and the relative importance of the policies. With these objections in 
mind, I have chosen U.S. policy towards Sudan under President George W. Bush as a 
case study to assess evangelical (in coalition with other religious conservatives) 
influence on U.S. foreign policy. The reason is first of all that this is an area where 
there has been a marked shift in policy from the Clinton-administration’s hands-off 
approach to the active engagement of President Bush. Mead and other observers claim 
this was largely due to the lobby campaign from conservative Christians with almost 
unlimited access to Bush’s White House. Secondly, there were opposing lobby 
interests at play in the case of Sudan: The oil and business lobbies favored a different 
approach than the Christian conservatives. Thirdly, national security interests became 
an increasingly important part of U.S. policy considerations also in Sudan after 
September 11, 2001, and the national security interest was not the same as the 
conservative Christian interest.  
 
I will lay out this argument in greater detail in my analysis, but in short it goes like 
this: By the end of 2000, Sudan was not a country where one would expect the United 
States to invest much political capital. And if the U.S. was to intervene, both economic 
and security interests indicated a policy in favor of the regime in Khartoum, and not a 
confrontational line favoring the Christians in the south as the religious conservatives 
propagated.  
  
A case study may disclose that other interest groups and/or interests are just as 
plausible explanations for U.S. policy towards Sudan as conservative Christian 
pressure. But if it seems likely that the United States involved heavily in Sudan 
because of evangelical pressure, and that the actual policy towards Sudan 
corresponded to the policy input of the evangelicals and not to those of other vital 
interests, this strengthens Walter Russell Mead’s claims about a “recasting” of foreign 
policy. We may in fact be witnessing an example of what Mead (2005) calls a 
“Wilsonian revival” in U.S. foreign policy.  
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2 Theory 
2.1 Theories on American interest groups 
A study of the influence of lobby groups rests on a basic premise that people organize 
into groups to promote their interests. “The causes of faction are sown in the nature of 
man,” James Madison (1981:16) wrote in The Federalist Papers.  His definition of 
faction still serves as a definition of an interest or pressure group: “By a faction, I 
understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the 
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of 
interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate 
interests of the community” (ibid). In this study, evangelical groups are treated as a 
faction by Madison’s definition. They are united by a common impulse to protect 
fellow Christians from persecution. Whether they are adversed to the rights of other 
Americans is perhaps debatable, but they are certainly adversed to the Islamist regime 
in Sudan.  
 
Madison’s writing is an early example of the discussion of the role of interest groups 
in politics. Arthur Bentley's The Process of Government (1908, quoted in Loomis and 
Cigler 2002) and David Truman's The Governmental Process (1951, quoted ibid) are 
probably the classic theories of interest groups in American politics.17 Building on 
Bentley’s ideas, Truman described American politics as a pluralist system where 
interest groups compete to a such degree that no single set of interests get to dominate. 
Theodore Lowi (1979) criticized this classic theory of interest group pluralism through 
his theory of interest group liberalism, in which he contended that interest groups are 
so successful in achieving their goals that government agencies can considered captive 
to organized interests, a tendency Lowi described as clientelism.  
 
 
17 Bentley is reprinted in abridged form in Richardson (ed.) 1993:19-22. The discussion of Truman’s work is 
based on Loomis and Cigler 2002:4-6. 
 19
 
As Truman had done, Lowi based his theory on a general assumption that whenever 
people have common interests, it is rational for them organize to achieve their goals. 
This was challenged by economist Mancur Olson in his The Logic of Collective Action 
(1965/1993). Olson based his analysis on the model of the rational economic man, and 
contended it would not always be rational for individual beings to invest time and 
money in participation in an interest group, when they could get the same benefits by 
staying outside. Olson has been criticized for emphasizing the material costs and 
benefits of group membership too heavily. Later works have emphasized so-called 
solidary benefits (fun, camaraderie, prestige) and expressive benefits (advancing a 
particular cause or ideology) of joining an interest group (Loomis and Cigler 2002:9-
10).  
 
What these classic studies on interest groups have in common is their preoccupation 
with economic and domestic policy-oriented interest groups. A central premise is that 
people form groups to pursue their personal interests. Mancur Olson noted that his 
theory “can be extended to cover communal, religious and philanthropic organizations, 
but the theory is not particularly useful in studying such groups” (Olson 1993:25).  
 
Furthermore, the classic theories are mostly concerned with describing the 
proliferation of interest groups, not their influence. This might be due to the fact that 
determining actual influence is, as one lobbyist has noted, “like finding a black cat in 
the coal bin at midnight” (quoted in Loomis and Cigler 2002:28). Loomis and Cigler 
list several examples of works that attempt to determine the influence of interest 
groups. Some give broad, societal overviews of how the structure of interest groups 
shapes the political system (like the classic studies of Rokkan and Olsen has done for 
Norway). And some try to explain specific patterns of influence at the level of 
individual lobbying efforts. “[B]ut even here the best work relies heavily on nuance 
and individualistic explanations,” Loomis and Cigler conclude (ibid.:26).  
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2.2 Theories on foreign policy interest groups 
The fact that classic interest group theories are preoccupied with the proliferation of 
economic and domestic interest groups make them ill suited for this thesis. But the 
theoretical body of interest group influence on foreign policy is much less developed. 
One reason is probably that the tradition Walter Russell Mead (2002:35-55) calls 
“continental realism” is so strong in political science. “On foreign policy the entire 
country is supposed to speak with a single voice. Policy is supposed to reflect a 
national interest that has its roots in moral principles,” Eric M. Uslaner states in his 
essay “Interest Groups and Foreign Policy” (2002:356). This may be a common 
perception. But a central premise of this thesis is nevertheless that states cannot be 
considered ‘black boxes’ as foreign policy-makers. Domestic politics matters; and 
interest groups matter in the decision-making process.  
 
The theoretical tradition called liberalism, liberal institutionalism and/or liberal 
utilitarianism in foreign policy theory argues that domestic politics matters. So does 
Walter Russell Mead. In his work Special Providence (2002), he describes four 
schools of thoughts in American society which all have shaped foreign policy thinking 
throughout U.S. history: Hamiltonianism, Wilsonianism, Jeffersonianism and 
Jacksonianism. For Mead, the increased foreign policy activism of religious 
conservatives has meant a revival of what he calls the Wilsonian school, named after 
President Woodrow Wilson. Wilsonians share the belief that America has a moral and 
practical duty to spread its values through the world. Mead (2002:132-174) puts 
special emphasis on missionaries as bearers of this tradition. 
 
The goal of this thesis is to provide an analysis of one specific interest group's possible 
influence. This will certainly mean relying heavily on nuance, as it is difficult to prove 
influence directly and as relatively little is written on the subject. But there are 
theoretical attempts to build on. Several scholars have noted the influence of ethnic 
lobby groups on U.S. foreign policy. I have already discussed the Israel lobby briefly 
in chapter one. The Greek, Cuban, Taipei-Chinese and East European lobbies are other 
examples on groups which have had their impact on foreign policy decisions as well. 
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One famous example is Vice President Nelson Rockefeller’s quote from a hearing on 
the conflict in the Middle East and the crisis between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus. In 
both instances, “it is foreign lobbies that are guiding U.S. policy,” Rockefeller 
contended (quoted in Howe and Trott 1977:4).  
 
Concluding a collection of essays on Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy, Mohammed 
E. Ahrari (1987:155-158) suggests three conditions for ethnic group success in foreign 
policy which he calls “determinants of their influence or power quotient” (ibid.:155). 
Although only the first criterion is directly applicable to ethnic American groups, at 
least two of Ahrari’s generalizations may be used as a framework in a discussion of 
religious groups and foreign policy as well:18
(1)  The group must press for a policy in line with U.S. strategic interests. 
(2)  The group must be assimilated into U.S. society, yet retain enough 
identification with the “old country” so that this foreign policy issue motivates 
people to take some political action. 
 
In the essay “Interest Groups and Foreign Policy”, Eric M. Uslaner (2002:358) refers 
to Ahrari, and adds three further criteria he believes groups need to fulfill in order to 
be influential: 
(3)  The policies that are advocated ought to be backed by the larger public. 
(4)  The groups must have enough members to wield political influence. Here, one 
may include other resources as well: A skilful staff, active members and 
strategically placed allies. 
(5)  The groups must be perceived as pursuing a legitimate interest. 
 
These are five general indicators of a lobby groups’ chances of influence on a foreign 
policy issue. Since most studies of ethnic lobbies deal with lobbying in Congress, one 
 
18 I skip his third criterion, that a group should have a high degree of homogeneity, since he labels this a minor 
determinant (Ahrari 1987:157). 
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may include a few further determinants of influence on Congress. Out of Crabb et.al.’s 
Congress and the Foreign Policy Process (2000:137-155) one can extract the 
following four criteria: 
(6)  Pressure directly from a representatives' constituency gives a representative 
incentives to act. 
(7)  Personal access to decision makers may secure direct action, as representatives 
act as individual “entrepreneurs” and not party representatives. 
(8) Success is more likely if there is no competition from other groups or groups 
with conflicting views on issue. 
(9) An ability to build broad and unlikely coalitions, so-called “strange 
bedfellows”, gives higher potential of a breakthrough in Congress.   
 
Since most of these latter criteria are directed at influence on Congress, and Congress' 
influence on foreign policy making often is minimal19, one may add one last criterion 
for success: 
(10) The ability to lobby the executive directly is a measure of an interest 
group’s influence. 
 
This adds up to a list of ten indicators of an interest group's influence on foreign policy 
making. Many of these are common-sense assumptions, but most of them are also 
tested on studies of ethnic lobbies. As an example, Uslaner cites the pro-Israel lobby as 
the most prominent example of a group that has satisfied most of the first seven 
criteria and therefore has been very influential for many years.20 The pro-Arab lobby, 
on the other hand, does not meet any of the seven criteria and remains a weak force in 
American foreign policy making (Urslaner ibid:358-364). 
 
19 Crabb et.al. (ibid:138) claim Congress’ influence is minimal. Ripley and Lindsay (1993) claimed Congress 
was resurging in foreign policy matters in the early 90s. Nowadays, talk of the ‘imperial presidency’ is in fashion 
again (Wolfensberger 2002). 
20 He claims, however, that some conditions have not been met in recent years and that the Israel lobby is not the 
same dominant force as it used to be. Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) seem not to share this view. 
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Even though they were developed in studies of ethnic lobbies, all of these indicators 
are applicable to a study of religious groups (apart from one criterion: number two, 
retaining ties with “old country”). I will use the indicators throughout the analysis to 
connect my study to earlier studies on lobby influence on foreign policy. If the faith-
based groups analyzed in this thesis meet all or most of the criteria, it tells that these 
groups share the same characteristics that have proven successful for ethnic lobby 
groups. This would be an indication that faith-based groups are likely to have some 
influence on U.S. foreign policy (although one should be careful making too broad 
generalizations, a point I will return to in the concluding chapter).  
 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Operationalization: U.S. policy towards Sudan 
How does one define U.S. policy towards Sudan? To answer this, one first needs to 
determine who conducts U.S. foreign policy. According to the U.S. Constitution, 
foreign policy is primarily the president’s domain. He is the chief diplomat who, 
together with his cabinet, conducts foreign policy on a day-to-day basis. He makes 
diplomatic appointments, negotiates treaties and sets policies through speeches and 
directives. Therefore, the policies of the president and his administration are the 
primary objects of this investigation. Congress also has a formal role in foreign policy 
making, through oversight, budgets and approval of appointments and treaties. In the 
case of evangelical influence, the role of Congress is interesting, since congressional 
legislation has been one of the evangelicals’ main areas as pressure group. Therefore, I 
will return to a discussion of which influence congressional law making has over 
presidential decision-making in the foreign policy field in my case analysis.  
 
Concerning the content of foreign policy, my research question addresses two different 
aspects. First of all, Mead and others claim the evangelicals’ main contribution has 
been to raise and alter the attention of the foreign policy makers. Therefore, I will 
measure attention. I will do this through an analysis of the level of rhetoric: How often 
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is Sudan mentioned in speeches, statements and policy documents from the 
administration? And more importantly: In which speeches and documents, and by who 
is Sudan mentioned? But foreign policy is more than attention: Mentioning the misery 
in Sudan now and then does not necessarily mean Sudan is a high foreign policy 
priority. Therefore, the second aspect is a measure of policy substance. Is it true, as 
Mead claims, that the U.S. “led the fight to end Sudan’s wars” (Mead 2006:38)? And 
if so, what kind of political investments did this leadership demand? I will measure 
this by looking at what specific measures the Bush administration utilized towards 
Sudan, compared to the Clinton administration; and by discussing the level and 
intensity of the involvement.  
 
3.2 Research design, validity and reliability 
In the case study of U.S. Sudan policy, I am especially interested in one independent 
variable: Influence from religiously conservative (and especially evangelical) interest 
groups. I will take a twofold approach to this independent variable: First, I will 
describe the coalition of evangelical Christians and other religious groups and how 
they work as foreign policy actors. Secondly, I will try to determine to which degree 
they influence policy in the case of Sudan.  
 
It is necessary to describe how religious conservatives act in foreign policy matters to 
be able to discuss whether they influence policy, especially since these groups have 
not been widely studied. As mentioned earlier, the fact that this is a largely untold 
story is one of the reasons I have chosen to address the question of evangelical 
influence through a case study instead of a general survey of different policy areas. 
This way, I hope to avoid repeating the often-superficial claims journals and news 
stories make about evangelical influence. A thorough case study may provide 
knowledge of how evangelicals and other religious conservatives work. This may 
again be used to discuss the potential influence of these groups on other policy areas as 
well. And as the discussion in the theory chapter showed, hardly any theory exists 
which deals with this issue specifically. In this regard, the first part of my analysis 
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resembles what Robert K. Yin (1994:29) calls an “exploratory” case study – a study 
that explores a subject where the existing knowledge base is poor. 
 
Even though this thesis has elements of exploration, its main aim is explanation. My 
primary interest is to determine whether evangelical pressure groups are a significant 
independent variable influencing U.S. foreign policy in the case of Sudan. How does 
one then measure influence? It is hard. “One lesson of these pages is that it may be 
futile to search for direct cause-and-effect relationships between religion and foreign 
policy”, Elliot Abrams concludes the introduction to one of the few studies on the 
issue, The Influence of Faith. Religious Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy (2001). One 
reason it is hard in the case of Sudan, is that there are no registries over lobby contact 
and furthermore, that the presidential minutes of 2001-2005 are secret for many years 
to come. It is difficult to know who spoke to whom when; and most studies on religion 
and foreign policy have concentrated on the more indirect influence of ideas.21 
Another reason is that since one has no control over the environment, one cannot find 
direct cause-and-effect relationships of the kind one finds in an experiment in a case 
study. But that does not mean one cannot discuss causality in case studies. Quite the 
opposite: According to Robert K. Yin (1994:6), case study is in fact the best suited 
research strategy when one investigates questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ on 
"contemporary events where one has no control over behavior events oneself". The 
key is to let a case study undergo the same tests as other types of research to secure the 
quality of the research design. The tests may be described as construct, internal and 
external validity; plus a test of reliability (ibid:33). 
 
Securing construct validity means making sure one measures what one wants to 
measure in the correct way. To meet this challenge, Yin (ibid:91) suggests using 
multiple sources of evidence as one principle. In my study, I have tried to achieve this 
triangulation by relying both on official documents (Congressional hearings, press 
 
21 See further discussion in chapter  4.3.3.3. 
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statements, briefings); secondary sources like newspaper and magazine articles; and 
personal interviews with relevant actors. I also interviewed actors both within different 
segments of the religiously conservative landscape, as well as secular observers of 
Sudan and religious conservatives to check and contrast the data I collected. Another 
principle is to “maintain a chain of evidence” that makes it possible for an external 
observer to trace the researcher’s argument (ibid:98). In this case, I have tried to 
achieve this chain by including numerous citations of and references to the statements 
that constitute the basis of my investigation. Furthermore, all interviews were made on 
the record and with a tape recorder, which makes it possible to check them. These 
precautions also address the question of reliability: demonstrating that a different 
researcher could collect the same data with the same result.  
 
Internal validity – establishing causal relationships within the study – is a particularly 
important concept in a study that strives at making claims on causality. How can I be 
sure that it was in fact conservative Christian lobbyists that prodded the Bush 
administration into intervening in Sudan, and not some other group or force? Yin 
(ibid:35) suggests two tactics that are directly relevant to this study. First, one may 
apply the logic of pattern-matching of independent variables to discuss rival 
explanations. I have done this in the sense that I develop and discuss five different 
explanations for Bush’s Sudan policy: Evangelical pressure; lobbying from secular 
human rights groups; lobbying from Afro-American groups; personal convictions; and 
strategic interests.  But these are not all mutually exclusive, which they have to be in 
order to predict different patterns (ibid:108). They may in fact all contribute to 
explaining the same outcome to varying degrees, and Yin’s second tactic therefore 
seems like a more appropriate description of this thesis: Explanation building. I try to 
explain Bush’s Sudan policy by “stipulating a set of causal links about it” (ibid:110). 
This means making initial theoretical statements I may compare the empirical data to. I 
have developed ten determinants of a lobby group’s potential power to serve this 
purpose. Furthermore, I discuss other plausible (rival) explanations for Bush’s Sudan 
policy and compare them to my initial explanation.  
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The third test, external validity, deals with the domain to which a study’s findings can 
be generalized. In a case study, generalization is not statistical but analytic – one may 
generalize from a case to a theoretical universe (ibid:30). The universe I can generalize 
to may be defined as “evangelical influence on U.S. foreign policy in general”. As 
previously mentioned, Sudan is chosen as a case because there has been a marked 
changed in policy on this area, a change that is widely attributed to evangelical 
pressure. Sudan may be what Harry Eckstein calls a “most likely case” (quoted in 
Andersen 1997:86): If evangelical pressure is not a likely explanation for policy 
change in this case, it seems less likely that evangelical pressure explains U.S. policies 
towards countries like China, North Korea or Israel, where evangelical influence also 
has been predicted, but the initial argument does not seem as strong. But in order to 
strengthen the external validity of this case study, a replication of its logic to other 
cases is necessary. Some suggestion will be made in the concluding chapter.  
 
3.3 On the use of sources 
Since the presidential records of the Bush administration are not yet disclosed, I have 
had to rely on open sources. The following provide the main sources: Existing 
research, although limited, has provided material for literature review. So have news 
stories. I have done systematic searches of news archives of the newspapers New York 
Times and Washington Post for Sudan-stories, as well as searches in the religious 
press, like the evangelical magazine Christianity Today. I have particularly looked for 
op-ed pieces by and interviews with religious leaders as well as their policy statements 
to get an impression of these groups' activities and views.22 The archives on the web 
pages of the various campaign organizations also provided material, as did transcripts 
of testimonies at congressional hearings. Presidential speeches and hearing transcripts 
from press conferences and congressional hearings provided the material for the 
 
22 Op-ed is an abbreviation for opposite editorial (the column traditionally placed on the opposite page of the 
editorial in the newspaper), and is a signed editorial representing the opinion of an individual contributor not 
necessarily affiliated with the newspaper.  
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analysis of the Bush-administrations views. Finally, I conducted first-hand interviews 
with participants of the lobbying campaign, observers of the campaign and Sudan 
analysts in Washington D.C. As mentioned, all the interviews were made on the record 
(all statements are openly attributed to the interviewees). They were semi-structured, 
thematic interviews and each lasted between 45 and 120 minutes. I sent out request to 
around 20 people whose names I had come over in my research. I aimed at talking to 
both participants in the faith-based lobby movement, Sudan lobbyists not affiliated to 
these groups, and analysts who could comment on the issue without being direct 
participants. In the end, I got eight interviews in Washington DC, and one more was 
conducted in Oslo a few weeks later. All categories were represented (five religious 
conservatives, three activists who were not religious conservatives, and one analyst). A 
complete list of the names and titles of the interviewees is included in the appendix.  
 
4 Analysis 
4.1 Background: U.S. policy in Sudan before 2001 
When the warring factions in northern and southern Sudan signed a peace treaty in 
January 2005, they ended a 21 years long civil war which had claimed an estimated 
two million lives (Martin 2002). This latest of several civil wars erupted when the 
national government in the north in 1983 revoked the autonomy that had been granted 
to the south for 11 years. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) took to 
arms against the north under its armed faction SPLA, lead by John Garang. Muslims 
opposed to Khartoum, organized as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), later 
joined these rebels.  
 
Although most commonly portrayed as a conflict between Muslim oppressors in north 
and Christian and animist rebels fighting for autonomy in south, the roots of the 
conflict are more complex. In The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, Douglas C. 
Johnson (2003) argues that Sudan’s recurring civil wars are a product of at least ten 
historical factors. Among them are the exploitive relationship between the central 
government in Khartoum (north) and the peripheries (south); the introduction of 
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militant Islam to the Muslim north that sharpened this divide; the postcolonial legacy 
and Sudan’s position in the power play of the cold war. 
 
U.S. policy towards Sudan up until 2001 is commonly interpreted as a reaction to this 
latter factor: Sudan’s position in the cold war struggle determined the U.S. geopolitical 
interest in the country (Connell 2001, Hentz 2004:27-29, Woodward 2006:17-37). 
When Sudan went pro-Soviet Nasserite in 1969, the U.S. put the country on their 
enemy list. When neighbouring Ethiopia went pro-Soviet in 1977, the U.S. started 
supporting Sudan again – during the 1980s, Sudan was the sixth largest recipient of 
U.S. military aid. But when Islamist NIF (National Islamic Front) seized power in 
1989, the U.S. stopped all bilateral aid immediately. As Osama bin Laden moved to 
Sudan, and the regime in Khartoum supported Iraq in the Gulf War in 1991, U.S. 
increased its effort to isolate the country. The Clinton administration labelled Sudan a 
“rogue state”, prohibited U.S. investment and increased anti-Sudan moves in the UN. 
In 1998, the U.S. bombed a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum as a reprisal for Sudan’s 
suspected harbouring of those responsible for the bombing of the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania. And Secretary of State Madeleine Albright promised U.S. 
military aid to SPLM. 
 
None of this did much to stop the civil war that raged between north and south all 
along. And up until 2001, the U.S. did not show great interest in brokering a peace 
agreement between north and south. A peace process had been underway for some 
years under the seven-country regional development organization Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD). But by 2000 this process was largely stalled. In 
1999, Madeleine Albright told a group of religiously conservative Sudan activists that 
the U.S. would not charge Sudan with genocide, as the activists wanted. Such a 
designation would require serious action from the government. But the human rights 
situation in Sudan was “not marketable to the American people”, Albright said 
(Hertzke 2004:275). Two years later, the U.S. was deeply involved as the main 
negotiator in peace talks between north and south Sudan. What had happened? The 
possible answers will be discussed in the following analysis. First through a 
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description of the coalition of religious conservative who had got engaged in Sudan in 
the late 90s, then by discussing different explanations for U.S. policy attention and 
substance towards Sudan. 
 
4.2 Description: The religious conservatives awaken 
There have been Christians in today’s Sudan far longer than there have been Christians  
in the United States. The first Christian missionaries arrived in Sudan from the Middle 
East in the 6th century. 1300 years later, the first American missionaries arrived to 
convert Muslims, traditional believers and believers in traditional Sudanese 
Christianity to the new gospel (Johnson 2003:14). The historical roots of the U.S. 
Christian involvement in Sudan lie in this missionary movement.  
 
Walter Russell Mead (2002:139) calls the story of American missionary activity the 
“lost history” of American foreign policy. “It has played a much larger role in the 
relationship of the United States to the world (…) than is generally recognized”.23 
Along with the great revivals of Christianity in the United States, American 
missionaries have spread around the world with increasing pace. At the beginning of 
the 20th century, there were around 5.000 American protestant missionaries around the 
world (ibid:142). The vast majority was in Asia, especially in China and Korea. 
Protestantism was introduced in Korea by American missionaries in 1899, and a few 
years later, Korea was considered such a fertile ground for missionaries that 
Pyongyang, now capital of communist North Korea, was widely known as “Asia's 
little Jerusalem” (Marquand 2003). Today, around 30 percent of the population in 
South Korea is Christian (19 percent protestant).  
 
 
23 Madeleine Albright (2006:26) makes a similar point in The Mighty and the Almighty. This point may be valid 
for Norway as well. Mead’s emphasis on missionary activity as a foreign policy driver bears resemblance to 
Olav Riste’s (2001) description of the “missionary impulse” as one of the main pillars of Norwegian foreign 
policy history”. 
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Today, there might be as many as 100.000 Americans serving religious missions 
abroad (Mead 2002:142). And the power shift from traditional, mainline Christianity 
to the more conservative evangelical branches has been just as evident in the 
missionary field as in the religious landscape in the U.S.. While eight out of ten 
protestant missionaries came from the mainline denominations at the end of the First 
World War, those same churches provided less than one out of ten missionaries by 
1996 (Pierson 2001:160). The influence of the Catholic Church has also declined 
considerably. Today, the Southern Baptist Convention alone fields the same amount of 
missionaries as the entire Catholic Church in the United States, and as all mainline 
U.S. denominations combined (Hertzke 2004:20). 
 
This long history of missionary activity, combined with the dramatic transformation of 
the missionary field, helps explaining why religious conservatives became increasingly 
aware of the persecution of Christians in Sudan in the mid-nineties, and decided to 
launch a campaign for Christians in Sudan, North Korea and China. The goal of this 
campaign was (and still is) to be Freeing God’s Children, as Allen D. Hertzke (2004) 
has called his insider’s account of the religious conservatives’ campaign. Hertzke 
notes four underlying conditions paving the way for this movement: (1) The spread of 
evangelical Christianity had shifted the Christian population toward the global south. 
Whereas 80 percent of the world’s Christian population lived in Europe and North 
America in 1900, this had declined to 40 percent by 2000. (2) The communications 
revolution had lead this new Christian population and their often difficult conditions 
much closer to fellow Christians in the States through the news network of the 
missionaries.24 (3) Furthermore, the fall of the iron curtain had opened up new areas 
for evangelization. (4) And finally, the revival of the religious conservatives and their 
 
24 Several places missionaries provide the main source for international news (Green 2007). As Peggy L. Shriver 
(2006:52), former assistant general secretary of the National Council of Churches of Christ  writes: “Combing 30 
years of North Carolina’s Gastonia Gazette, 1940-70, (…) I was struck with how parochial the newspaper was. 
Almost the only international news appeared in the Gazette’s religion page, usually reporting missionary 
accounts.” 
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organizational network in the United States had created a forceful movement able to 
engage for their persecuted brothers and sisters worldwide.  
 
This movement has its organizational roots in movements set up to counter 
Communism and its persecution of Christians after the Second World War. Groups 
like Voice of the Martyrs, Open Doors with Brother Andrew and Christian Solidarity 
International smuggled bibles through the Iron Curtain and raised money for 
Christians in Soviet and China. The Iron Curtain eventually fell down, but religious 
persecution did not perish. Christians in the United States continued to receive news 
about persecuted believers in countries like China, North Korea – and Sudan. “More 
Christians have been martyred for their faith in the twentieth century, than in the 
previous nineteen centuries combined”, human rights lawyer Nina Shea at the Center 
for Religious Persecution at Freedom House dramatically claimed in her book In the 
Lion’s Den (1997: ix). Along with her colleague Paul Marshall’s Their Blood Cries 
Out (1997), this book became a rallying call for the lobby campaign against religious 
persecution in the U.S. Congress. A campaign which triumphed as Congress in 1998 
passed the International Religious Freedom Act. 
 
At that point, Sudan was already high on the religious conservatives' agenda. Since the 
National Islamic Front seized power in Khartoum in 1989, American missionaries had 
sent home news about forced Islamization, and even mass slaughter of Sudanese 
Christians in the south. While traditional historians and secular analysts would 
emphasise the complex nature of the civil war (Human Rights Watch 2003, Johnson 
2003, Center for Strategic and International Studies 2001), Christian activists bluntly 
stated that this was “a war on religion”, as Nina Shea titled an op-ed in the Wall Street 
Journal (1998). Neither did missionaries and their organizations back home hesitate 
using the word genocide to describe what was being done to their brothers and sisters 
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in Sudan.25 Some even contended that the loosely estimated two million victims of the 
war between north and south all were Christians that had been purposefully 
slaughtered, although the victims were both Muslims and believers of old faiths as 
well (Hertzke 2004:261).  
 
What really prompted evangelical organizations into action in the United States was 
the campaign against slavery in Sudan (McDonnell 2007, Saunders 2007). Initiated by 
U.S. director of Christian Solidarity International (CSI) John Eibner, it spurred 
thousands of Christians in the States to raise money to redeem Sudanese Christians 
from Arab slave traders. Along with fellow evangelist Charles Jacobs, who founded 
the American Anti-Slavery Group in 1994, Eibner claims to have redeemed at least 
80.000 slaves by buying off local slave-traders (Hertzke 2004:112). This undertaking 
caused controversy. Organizations such as UNICEF and Human Rights Watch (1999) 
criticized the practice, and in 2002 a front page article in Washington Post claimed that 
SPLA-commanders exploited the redeemers by stage-managing transactions, passing 
off free people as slaves (Vick 2002). Nevertheless, millions of dollars were raised by 
evangelical networks in the States, slavery in Sudan became an issue on Christian TV-
networks and a high school class made national headlines by raising 50.000 dollars for 
slave-redemption (Sink 1998, Woodbury 1998).  
 
Another channel of action was humanitarian relief. Several evangelical relief 
organizations were established in Sudan in the 1990s. The most notable was probably 
Franklin Graham’s Samaritan’s Purse. Son of Billy Graham, the father of modern 
evangelicalism in the States, and heir to his empire of ministries, Franklin Graham is 
also one of President Bush’s closest religious confidantes, and held the invocation on 
his inauguration ceremony in 2001. Graham visited Sudan several times, and wrote 
 
25 “Much like a novice writer enchanted with exclamation points, it repeatedly uses the term “genocidal” to 
describe the actions of the government in Sudan”, T. Jeremy Gunn of the American Civil Liberties Union (2001) 
mocked the advisory Commission on International Religious Freedom’s use of the word in 1999. Nonetheless, 
the House of  Representatives followed suit, and labelled Sudan “genocidal” later the same year (Shea 2000).  
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and spoke about Sudan in the press. “This carnage, the most appalling I have seen in 
my 25 years as an international relief worker (…) is happening in Sudan, where the 
Muslim government is waging a brutal war against Christians,” Graham (2000) wrote 
in an op-ed in Wall Street Journal in 2000. He concluded with the following warning: 
“If we turn a blind eye to the plight of the people being mistreated in Africa (…), I 
believe God will judge this nation. His hand of blessing could easily and quickly be 
removed.” 
 
Graham was not the only top-tier evangelical leader who spoke out about Sudan in the 
late 1990s: Richard Land (2007), policy director of the Southern Baptist Convention 
(by far the nation’s largest protestant denomination) made Sudan part of his policy 
advocacy. Chuck Colson – once chief council for President Nixon, jailed for 
Watergate, born-again as an evangelical in jail and later founder of Prison Fellowship 
to reform U.S. jails – campaigned for Sudan through his own think-tank the 
Wilberforce Forum (named after the English statesman and evangelical who lead the 
fight to abolish slavery in the 1800s). Colson is considered one of the best-connected 
lobbyists among U.S. evangelicals (Cooper and Tumulty 2005). Richard Cizik is a 
third example. As chief lobbyist for the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), 
he had a power base of 30 million members (and potential voters) to use in his 
campaigning for Sudan (Sheler 2006:227-271).26 In comparison, the National Rifle 
Association (NRA) has around four million members. The largest nongovernmental 
organization in the United States, American Association of Retired People (AARP), 
has 35 million members.27 As Eric M. Uslaner (2002:358) notes, membership is an 
important indicator of political influence (criteria four in my theory chapter). 
 
 
26 Both Land and Cizik were interviewed personally for this thesis.  
27 Numbers taken from web pages: http://www.nraila.org/About/ and 
http://www.aarp.org/about_aarp/aarp_overview/a2003-01-13-aarphistory.html. 
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It is important to note that although their organizational basis was mainly among 
evangelical churches, not all faith-based activists were evangelicals. Nina Shea, 
according to Allen D. Hertzke (2004:274) the most central campaigner, is a Catholic. 
And the one Richard Land (2004) and Richard Cizik (2007) consider being the most 
central, Michael Horowitz, is a Jew. Horowitz, a former appointee at Reagan’s White 
House is now activist and analyst at the Hudson Institute where he took the initiative 
to what became the International Religious Freedom Act, and later spearheaded the 
evangelical Sudan campaign. Among his PR initiatives was hiring celebrity lawyers 
Ken Starr and Johnnie Cochran to defend him in court when he was arrested for 
protesting outside the Sudanese embassy (Raspberry 2001).28 Horowitz is not shy 
about taking credit for his role in the Sudan campaign: “Debbie and I were behind the 
peace deal in Sudan,” he bluntly stated in a personal interview (Horowitz 2007). 
Debbie is Deborah Fikes of the Midland Ministerial Alliance in Texas, who built a 
grass root effort for Sudan in President Bush's hometown (Neumayr 2003). Horowitz 
attributes his commitment to persecuted Christians to his Jewish background: “Sudan 
is the Hitler-regime of our time,” he says about the Islamist regime (O’Beirne 2001).  
Horowitz was not the only prominent Jewish American who campaigned for 
Christians in Sudan. Elliot Abrams, once Assistant Secretary of State under Reagan, 
travelled to Sudan to interview Christian refugees as chairman of the Commission on 
International Religious Freedom, and in an article in Weekly Standard he outlined how 
the Bush administration should approach the crisis (Abrams 2001b). One month after 
the article was printed; Abrams became one of National Security Adviser Condoleezza 
Rice’s deputies.29
  
Another important component of the Christian conservative campaign for Sudan was 
to be found at Capitol Hill. The Republican landslide election in 1994 had made 
 
28 The two were the main stars of two of the most famous legal battles in U.S. history: The investigation of 
president Bill Clinton (Starr), and the O.J.Simpson-case (defended by Cochran). 
29 He was appointed Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations at the National 
Security Council.  
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Congress considerably more religiously conservative.30 Many of these politicians got 
involved in Sudan. When a disastrous famine spread across southern Sudan in 1998, 
evangelical relief agencies delivered aid to prevent what they considered to be a 
“manufactured famine” to exterminate the Sudanese Christians (Shea 1998). One of 
the relief workers who went to Sudan with Samaritan’s Purse in 1998, was the 
physician and junior senator from Tennessee, Bill Frist, who five years later was to 
become Senate majority leader and one of the most powerful politicians in the United 
States. “The radical Islamic regime in Khartoum is unmatched in its barbarity toward 
the sub-Saharan or “black African” Christians of the countries south,” Frist (1998) 
wrote in an op-ed in Washington Post upon returning from his trip. He called for a 
much tougher U.S. policy towards the regime in Khartoum. Frist is the most prominent 
example of the Christian conservative politicians who raised the issue of Sudan in 
Congress from the late 90s onwards. Apart from him, Allen D. Hertzke’s 
(2004:appendix) list of “fervent members of Congress” includes senators Sam 
Brownback (Republican) and Don Nickles (R); and House representatives Chris Smith 
(R), Frank Wolf (R), Tony Hall (Democrat), Tom Tancredo (R), Joseph Pitts (R) and 
Spencer Bachus (R). Eight Republicans and one Democrat, all Christian 
conservatives.31  
 
By 1999, an organised “Sudan Campaign” had formed in Washington DC under Nina 
Shea’s direction at the Freedom House.32 Although largely a “grass top-movement” 
consisting of elite lobbyists and activists from faith-based organizations, the campaign 
 
30 One measure is the Christian Coalition’s scorecards. In the Congress before 1994, 30 percent of House 
representatives and 26 percent of the senators voted in line with their views in at least 80 percent of the votes. 
After 1994, the numbers were 43 and 36 percent respectively (Martin 1999). 
31 Seven of the nine received a full 100 points in the Christian Coalition’s scorecard in 2004 
(http://www.cc.org/2004scorecard.pdf). Frank Wolf received 84 points and Tony Hall was not in the House at 
the time. Pitts and Brownback also co-chaired the “Values Action Team”,  a forum which coordinated strategy 
between lawmakers and social-conservative activists (Stone and Vaida 2004). 
32 The campaign organization still existed in early 2007, but was now directed towards Darfur 
(www.sudancampaign.com). 
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also activated the grass roots of American evangelicalism. From 1996 on, 
“International Days of Prayer for the Persecuted Church” were organised on an annual 
basis by the World Evangelical Fellowship (WEF). From a core group of 7.000 
churches, this day of prayer quickly grew to encompass over 100.000 U.S. churches of 
all denominations, where ordinary churchgoers would pray for fellow Christians in 
Sudan and learn about their plight from the pulpit.33 In a personal interview, director 
Faith McDonnell of the Church Alliance for a New Sudan quoted Representative 
Frank Wolf noting the following on this phenomenon: “There are more churches than 
chambers of commerce in the United States. So if you want to influence foreign 
policy, you have to influence the churches.” 
 
News on Sudan also penetrated religious media. One example is the religiously based 
TV-series “Touched by an Angel”, which was one of CBS’ most popular shows in the 
90s. It aired an entire episode dedicated to the issue of slavery in Sudan in 1999. 
Christian college networks and Christian rock stars also campaigned for Sudan 
(Lobdell 2001). In august 2001 30.000 young Christians gathered in Midland, Texas 
(George W. Bush’s hometown) for the festival “Rock the Desert”. The following year, 
90.000 attended. There they were met by campaign material like a mock slave cell to 
inform about persecution of Christians in Sudan. This event spurred what was later to 
become the Midland Ministerial Alliance, which became a central part of the 
evangelical Sudan campaign at later stages (Neumayr 2003). 
 
As the Bush administration came into office in January 2001, the issue of Christian 
persecution in Sudan was well established as a cause worth fighting for among 
evangelicals. In a survey from the Ethics and Public Policy Center (2002) more than 
70 percent of the 300 pastors, advocates, radio hosts and other members of the 
“evangelical elites” who were asked had “heard a lot” about the situation for 
Christians in Sudan. More than 40 percent had contributed to an organization working 
 
33 Numbers are WEF's own estimate. Taken from their webpage www.persecutedchurch.com. 
 38
 
                                             
for Sudan. However, the activists felt they got nowhere with the Clinton administration 
on the issue. According to Michael Horowitz (2007), Clinton was ”awful on Sudan”. 
The activists were “struck by the huge disparity between the genocidal scale of 
atrocities being committed by the government of Sudan and the muted response of the 
President and Secretary of State of the United States,” Nina Shea (2000b) said in a 
testimony before Congress on September 28, 2000 as a representative of the 
International Commission on International Religious Freedom. By the end of 2000, the 
faith-based movement was ready to take on the new president and his administration 
on Sudan.  
 
4.3 First aspect: U.S. policy attention  
4.3.1 Suddenly, Sudan 
The premise underlying the thesis of Walter Russell Mead and others that evangelical 
pressure directed President Bush’s attention towards Sudan is that president Clinton 
did not pay the same level of attention. Is this true? A search in the The American 
Presidency Project’s database with the keyword “Sudan” reveals that President Clinton 
did mention Sudan in 12 speeches during his last four-year term in office. 34  Thus, it is 
obviously not true when Nina Shea (2004) in Weekly Standard states that president 
Bush “became the first president to emphasize the Sudanese conflict in a public 
speech“. In fact, the last time Clinton mentioned Sudan in a public speech – just a few 
weeks before he left office, he addressed Shea and her compatriots directly: “[L]et me 
say especially to the students, religious communities, and human rights activists who 
have done so much to publicize the atrocities of Sudan, America must continue to 
press for an end to these egregious practices and make clear that the Sudanese 
Government cannot join the community of nations until fundamental changes are 
made on these fronts” (Clinton 2000). 
 
34 The database is located at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and contains all public papers issued by 
presidents Clinton and Bush (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php). 
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However, apart from this speech, a closer look at the 11 others speeches shows that 
Clinton actually never addressed the conflict in length until this single occasion, when 
he was on his way out of office. On four occasions he mentioned the U.S. bombing of 
a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan. In the other seven speeches, Sudan is only 
mentioned summarily in sentences like: “War still tears at the heart of Africa. Congo, 
Sierra Leone, Angola, Sudan have not yet resolved their conflicts” (Clinton 1999). No 
initiatives were taken by the Clinton-administration to mediate in the conflict between 
north and south. Clinton did appoint a special envoy, to Sudan in 1999, former 
congressman Harry Johnston. But Johnston did not make any new peace initiatives. 
The administration’s approach was to isolate rather than engage Khartoum. And 
although Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did meet with SPLA-commanders and 
promised them direct aid, no such aid materialized (Connell 2001:2). In other words, 
Sudan seems to have remained a “back-burner issue” to the Clinton administration, as 
the faith-based movement claimed.35 This is confirmed by observers not affiliated to 
the faith-based campaign movement interviewed in Washington DC. Sudan expert 
David Smock (2007) at the congressionally founded United States Institute of Peace 
(USIP) and Sudan campaign manager at the International Crisis Group (ICG) Colin 
Thomas-Jensen (2007) both stated that there was a marked shift in policy from the 
Clinton to the Bush administration. Former special envoy for the UN to the horn of 
Africa and Norwegian ambassador Tom Vraalsen (2005:79) states the same in his 
exposé on the experiences from conflict resolution in Sudan: “In 2001, a fundamental 
change occurred in U.S. policy towards the civil war in Sudan. From a non-
interventionist policy, which was mainly limited to condemning the regime in 
Khartoum, the United States now moved on to a policy of constructive engagement” 
(my translation). 
 
 
35 According to the Sudan Campaign (2000), the term ”back-burner” even figured in a policy paper on Sudan 
from the Clinton administration.  
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When George W. Bush entered the White House, there were no indications that Sudan 
would become a higher priority for him than it had been for his predecessor. In fact, 
the general impression from Bush’s election campaign was that he did not have much 
of a foreign policy at all, apart from a perception that the country was better off not 
getting heavily involved in foreign conflicts (Melby 2004:9-16). When Bush was 
asked about his policy on Africa in one of the television debates, he simply answered: 
“We don’t have any vital interests there” (Lyman 2006:49). However, after only four 
months in the White House, Bush had mentioned Sudan on three different occasions. 
First, Sudan was mentioned in two speeches in March 2001 along with the countries 
China, Cuba and Iraq as countries that deny religious freedom to their citizens (Bush 
2001a, b). At the same time, Secretary of State Colin Powell (2001:48), at his first 
hearing before the House committee on International Relations stated that “there is 
perhaps no greater tragedy on the face of the Earth today than the tragedy that is 
unfolding in the Sudan”. Powell promised the country would be a top priority for him. 
This prompted Washington Post into writing a story titled “Suddenly, Sudan” 
(Mcgrory 2001); and then, two weeks later the cover story “Christians’ Plight in Sudan 
Tests a Bush Stance” (Mufson 2001b), pointing to the contrast between this rhetoric 
and the lack of attention to foreign policy, and especially Africa, before the election.  
 
Then, in a speech to the American Jewish Committee on May 3 – with Shimon Peres, 
Joschka Fisher and Vicente Fox as guests, Bush devoted three full paragraphs to the 
civil war in Sudan: “We must turn the eyes of the world upon the atrocities in the 
Sudan,” Bush stated, and announced that he had appointed USAID chief Andrew 
Natsios as a special humanitarian coordinator to Sudan. “Our actions begin today, and 
my administration will continue to speak and act for as long as the persecution and 
atrocities in the Sudan last,” the president concluded (Bush 2001c).  
 
During the summer of 2001, a Sudan policy review was under way in the State 
Department. And by September 6, 2001, Bush’s actions had led him to appoint long-
time senator and Episcopalian priest John Danforth as “Special Envoy for Peace to 
The Sudan”. Danforth got a considerable staff with full-time presence at the peace 
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negotiations in Kenya (Snyder 2004). He also got a specific mission to end the country 
s civil war: “Our administration is deeply committed – is deeply committed – to 
bringing good folks together, from within our country and the leadership of other 
nations, to get this issue solved once and for all,” Bush (2001d) stated at the ceremony 
in the Rose Garden. What explains this sudden will to get involved in this then 18 
years old and complicated civil war in a continent far away?  
 
4.3.2 Primary explanation: Evangelical pressure 
Media and observers by and large explained Bush’s involvement in Sudan with the 
pressure from evangelical lobby groups. “The Bush administration, prodded in part by 
American Christian evangelical groups, (…) has taken an unusual interest in the Sudan 
civil war,” New York Times stated (Weisman 2003). “Bush officials have been 
lobbied heavily by fundamentalist Christian groups,” Washington Post explained 
(Vick 2001). “The conservative religious lobby in the U.S. (…) pressured the U.S. 
government to maintain a harder line on Sudan,” Human Rights Watch (2003:478) 
concluded in one of their analyses. There are, however, other possible explanations 
why Sudan suddenly caught the Bush-administration’s attention. I will turn to these 
soon. But first: How plausible is the established thesis that Bush’s involvement in 
Sudan was a result of faith-based pressure? 
 
A first indication that faith is involved is Bush’s own rhetoric on Sudan. The first two 
times Bush mentioned Sudan; he did it as an example of religious persecution 
(whereas Clinton talked about the civil war without mentioning religion). When Bush 
appointed John Danforth, Bush did not mention religious persecution. He did, 
however, mention the slavery issue. And as he explained his motivation for 
intervening, he seemed to be addressing organizations like Billy Graham’s Samaritan’s 
Purse directly: “We're committed to bringing stability to the Sudan, so that many 
loving Americans, nongovernmental organizations, will be able to perform their duties 
of love and compassion within that country without fear of reprisal” (Bush 2001d). 
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The appointments of Andrew Natsios and John Danforth as special envoys can itself 
be interpreted as gestures towards the faith-based movement. The appointments were 
made in spite of the new Secretary of State Colin Powell initial wish to scale back on 
the use of special envoys (Royce 2001). Natsios’ previous job was as director at 
WorldVision, one of the Christian relief organizations involved in the campaign. 
Danforth was an ordained priest, and this appointment also went down well with the 
evangelicals (Hertzke 2004:289).36 In fact, the Bush administration’s first choice as 
special envoy was Chester Crocker, U.S. secretary of state for African affairs in the 
Reagan administration. But Christian conservative coalition members claim their 
pressure secured that Crocker was not appointed. “We fought pretty hard against 
Crocker,” Faith McDonnell (2007) of the Church Alliance for a New Sudan stated in a 
personal interview. Crocker was one of the architects behind the “constructive 
engagement” policy with apartheid South Africa in the 1980s and did not have the 
trust of the religious conservatives. In the end, Crocker himself declined the job when 
he could get sufficient guarantees that religious conservatives would not interfere in 
his work (Inter Press Service 2000). Danforth (2006:189-190) himself was not in 
doubt who were the main drivers behind Bush’s Sudan policy: “[T]he energy fueling 
our effort in Sudan was clear to me when I saw the Christian leaders in the audience 
that day [when Danforth was appointed as envoy in the Rose Garden] and when I 
considered the religious convictions of President Bush. American Christians wanted 
our government to make every effort to end the world’s longest lasting civil war,” he 
writes in his autobiography.  
 
Franklin Graham’s position as one of President Bush’s religious mentors points to one 
of the most crucial factor behind the apparent success of the faith-based campaign: 
Elite access. As Crabb et.al. (2000:141) notes, direct access to Representatives is 
 
36 Danforth is, however, a self-proclaimed religious moderate, and in 2005 he wrote a sharp critique of the 
Christian Right, which prompted a sharp rebuttal from Richard Land and other evangelicals who were involved 
in the Sudan campaign (Danforth 2005, Slevin 2006).  
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crucial, since the Representatives act as individual entrepreneurs in law-making 
(criterion seven in the theory chapter). But in foreign policy matters, the “Entrepeneur-
in-Chief” is undoubtedly the president (hence criterion ten: direct access to the 
executive). According to the New York Times, Graham himself has said he used a 
breakfast with Bush one week before the election to pressure the soon to become 
president-elect on the need for American involvement in Sudan (Goodstein 2001). 
Shortly after Bush took office, a delegation of religious leaders was summoned to meet 
with Bush’s principal advisor Karl Rove for an hour long discussion of Sudan 
(Bumiller 2003). Among the leaders was Charles Colson of the Wilberforce Forum. 
He said to be a personal friend of President Bush, and is one of the evangelical leaders 
who later were to have weekly conference calls with Karl Rove and Bush’s liaison to 
the evangelical community Tim Goeglein to discuss policy initiatives (Stone and 
Vaida 2004).37 Another is Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention. “There's 
no question this is the most receptive White House to our concerns and to our 
perspective of any White House that I've dealt with, and I've dealt with every White 
House from Reagan on,” Land (2004) said in an interview. Other activists share this 
impression: “We tried to reach Clinton, but did not get much response. He had a 
firewall around him that did not let us in that much,” Faith McDonnell (2007) stated.  
 
Having access does not mean getting everything your way. “It’s not like the Bush 
administration did everything evangelicals wanted, not by a long shot,” William 
Saunders (2007) at the Family Research Council underlined in a personal interview. 
He founded the organization Sudan Relief Inc. to campaign for Sudan. But Bush’s 
White House nevertheless seems to have been more receptive to evangelical groups 
than previous administrations.38 One reason may be that the Bush-administration was 
 
 
37 As a further illustration of close ties: Tim Goeglein was a former aide to Gary Bauer, previous leader of 
Family Research Council, evangelical Sudan-advocate and another participant at the weekly conference calls. 
38 The views differ though: Richard Cizik (2007) of the National Association of Evangelicals said the 
receptiveness depends on the issue. David Kuo (2006), who served as Deputy Director of the Office of Faith-
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full of evangelicals itself. According to presidential historian Garry Scott Smith 
(2006:366), there had never been so many conservative Christians in the White House 
as under George W. Bush. One of them was Michael Gerson, who was Bush’s 
principal speechwriter at the time he delivered the speeches were Sudan was 
mentioned. “During my time in the White House, the most intense and urgent 
evangelical activism I saw did not come on the expected values issues—though 
abortion and the traditional family weren't ignored—but on genocide, global AIDS and 
human trafficking. The most common request I received was, "We need to meet with 
the president on Sudan"—not on gay marriage,” Gerson (2006) writes in a 
commentary in Newsweek. 
 
Elite access was also secured through the recruitment of the new administration. I have 
already mentioned Elliot Abrams as one Sudan-advocate who secured a post in the 
Bush-administration. Michael Miller is another. He also got a job in the National 
Security Council. Until then, he was Senator Bill Frist’s assistant, and travelled with 
Frist to Sudan (Mcgrory 2001). Frist himself was “Bush’s main man in the Senate and 
sees the president all the time,” according to Washington Post (ibid). It also seems 
probable that Frist and other Christian conservatives in Congress who had campaigned 
for deeper involvement in Sudan all had greater access to the Bush-administration than 
they had to the Clinton-administration.  
 
The elite access-argument seems further strengthened when one considers the 
signatories of a letter sent to President Bush a few days after his inaugural, calling on 
him to make ending the “genocide” in Sudan a foreign policy priority, along with 
stopping sex trafficking and religious persecution of minorities in China (Mufson 
2001a). Among the signatories were (apart from the already mentioned Elliot Abrams, 
Chuck Colson and the president of the National Association of Evangelicals) Paula J. 
 
Based and Community Initiatives in the Bush administration wrote a whole book lambasting what he believed 
was a hypocritical attitude towards evangelicals in the administration. 
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Dobriansky of the Council of Foreign Relations (who was nominated by Bush as 
Under Secretary of Democracy and Global Affairs at the State Department a few 
weeks later); Harvard professor Michael Novak; Marvin Olasky, the man behind the 
consept “compassionate conservatives”; and former CIA-director James Woolsey.  
 
Another argument is organizational strength. Although in large part a “grass tops 
movement”, the faith-based lobbyists gained strength and legitimacy from their 
grassroots support in the evangelical community. As described in the introductory 
chapter, evangelicals have come to constitute a very important subgroup in American 
society numerically. “When you get 100,000 churches focused on this, they begin to 
talk to their congressmen,” Richard Land (2004) said about the Sudan campaign. One 
example of how this grassroots power worked is the Sudan involvement of Tom 
Tancredo. He came into Congress in 1999 from the district in Colorado were 
schoolchildren had got national attention for raising 50.000 dollars to slave-
redemption in Sudan (Human Rights Watch 2003:484). And according to Crabb et.al. 
(2000:142), “no single factor is likely to be more crucial in determining the positions 
of members of the House and Senate on questions of public policy than constituency 
influence” (criterion six). 
 
Just as important as numerical strength is probably the evangelicals’ organizational 
strength: “Religious conservatives have created the largest, best-organized grassroots 
social movement of the last quarter century,” Robert D. Putnam (2000:162) writes in 
Bowling Alone, his study on the development of civic engagement in the States since 
the 1960s. According to Putnam, “faith communities are arguably the single most 
important repository of social capital in America” (ibid:66). Churches are among the 
arenas where most Americans meet most often, not only to pray but also to discuss and 
learn about social issues. And whereas overall church attendance has dropped 
somewhat since the peak in the early 1960s – along with overall civic engagement, 
evangelical activism provides one of the counter-trends of increased activism. This 
means the relative numerical and organizational power of evangelicals has increased 
considerably over the past decades. This is evident in their voting power: In 2004, self-
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described born-agains constituted 40 percent of George W. Bush’s electorate. If one 
also includes the votes of Catholic traditionalists and Mormons, Bush received 60 
percent of his vote from religious conservatives (Smith 2006:376). Finally, 
strengthened organizational and voting power also means strengthened lobbying 
power: One measurement is the polls made by National Journal on perceived lobby 
strength in Congress. In 2005, when representatives were asked the question “which 
special interest group would members of your party buck more often if the group 
weren’t so powerful?”, Christian conservatives were second among Republicans, only 
beaten by the National Rifle Association (Vaida 2005).  
 
A final argument in the evangelical pressure-explanation is the breadth of the Sudan 
coalition. Although the grassroots activity was largely confined to evangelical groups, 
the elite coalition was much broader, encompassing Jews, Catholics and secular 
activists. Allen D. Hertzke calls it an “unlikely alliance for human rights.”39 Crabb et. 
al. (2000:144) call it “strange bedfellows” (criterion nine): “Nearly always, successful 
lobbying campaigns are waged by coalitions or alliances among pressure groups 
having common goals”. Michael Horowitz (2007) cited gaining left-right support as 
one of the main principles of his lobbying strategy. But the most unlikely thing about 
the Sudan coalition was the bridging between religious groups with centuries-long 
antagonisms. Historically, Protestants and Catholics have not been natural bedfellows 
in American politics; neither have evangelicals and Jews in modern times. The fact 
that the campaigns for religious freedom and Sudan seem to have contributed to a 
diminishment of old theological tensions may be one of the movements’ main 
strengths. “American evangelicals and orthodox Jews appear set to write a new and 
original chapter in the long and troubled story of relations between the faiths. Their 
 
39 The subtitle of his book Freeing God’s Children. 
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alliance could well be deeper and more stable than many observers believe,” Walter 
Russell Mead predicts (2005:92).40
 
In the Sudan case, this new alliance is evident in the campaigning of Jews like Michael 
Horowitz and Elliot Abrams, which I have already described. Other examples are the 
involvement of Elie Wiesel, who was among the people who wrote to President 
Clinton about “how the genocide in Sudan haunted him” (Sudan Campaign 2000); and 
the long-time Sudan activism of Rabbi David Saperstein of the Religious Action 
Center of Reform Judaism (RAC).41 Yet another is the fact that the U.S. Holocaust 
Memorial Museum made the plight of southern Sudan the first exhibit mounted by its 
then new-founded “Committee of Conscience”. Among the participants at a meeting 
on Sudan organized by the museum in February 2001 were the American Civil 
Liberties Union and several Catholic bishops (Mufson 2001). The U.S. Catholic 
Conference condemned the “cruel, fratricidal conflict in Sudan” in 2000 and sent a 
delegation to the country lead by cardinal Bernhard Law (United States Office of 
Catholic Bishops 2000).  
 
4.3.3 Alternative explanations 
Present at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in February 2001 also were 
representatives of the Congressional Black Caucus, the organization representing 
African American members of Congress. One could assume that the longest civil war 
in Africa would be just as big a concern for the African-American communities as for 
predominantly white evangelicals; and activism from African-American lobbyists is 
one of several alternative explanations for the Bush-administration’s involvement in 
 
40 In a personal interview, expert on the relationship between religion and politics John C. Green at Pew Forum, 
however claims that “alliance is too strong a word” to describe the relationship between Jews and evangelicals. 
In his opinion, Israel is about the only issue that unites the two groups (Green 2007). 
41 RAC is the center for social activism for more than 900 Jewish congregations representing 1,5 million 
American Jews (http://rac.org).  
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Sudan. Others include pressure from other human rights lobby groups; and the 
possibility that foreign policy in this case is not at all best explained as a result of 
domestic lobbying, but rather as a product of the president’s personal convictions, or 
of economic or security interests. These four possible explanations will be explored in 
this section.  
 
4.3.3.1 Explanation 1: Afro-American lobbying 
“The lesson should be to involve more organisations in the fight against the Sudanese 
genocide. Where are the organisations of Afro-Americans in this campaign? Why are 
they not crying out about African holocausts?” one commentator asked after having 
attended a press conference at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, just a few 
months before the large meeting where Afro-American groups were heavily 
represented (Afrol.com 2000). Jeff Drumtra of the U.S. Committee for Refugees had 
just given a speech where he attacked the media for not paying attention to the crisis in 
Sudan. Although there were Afro-American voices speaking up for Sudan in the 
United States since the early 1990s, review of academic literature, reports and articles 
in the press strongly suggest that the Afro-American community was not a main driver 
in the domestic lobby campaign for Sudan. They were however to become an 
important part of the campaign initiated by Christian conservatives, and may help to 
explain why this campaign became such a persuasive force.  
 
Furthermore, there were few voices of Sudanese exiles in the debate on Sudan. That is, 
there were some, but in total the white American voices dominated. One reason may 
be that there is no coherent Sudanese-American society in the States. Sudanese 
migration into the U.S. is a relatively new phenomenon; almost all Sudanese have 
arrived from the late 1980s onward, and up until around 2000 the annual numbers 
could still be counted in the hundreds (Abusharaf 2002:6-9). Which means 
Mohammed Ahrari’s second criterion – that an ethnic group must retain ties to its “old 
country” to be motivated into action – is probably not fulfilled. This criterion in fact 
seems more fitting to describe the ties between missionaries in Sudan and their 
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“brothers and sisters” in the United States. The missionaries both had strong emotional 
ties to Sudan as well as a strong organizational network in the United States. One 
group of exiles is worth mentioning, however: The lost boys of Sudan. These were a 
group of around 3.600 young boys who had lived in a refugee camp in Kenya for 
several years after having fled the war in Sudan. In 2001 they were allowed to resettle 
in the States, and their stories received broad media coverage. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell met several of the boys personally in June 2001, as the review of Bush’s Sudan 
policy was underway.42 “To act you must get to know those you act on behalf of. You 
must have a personal stake in it. The lost boys did a lot to move people into action,” 
Faith McDonnell (2007) stated. She has worked with several of the lost boys.  
 
According to Human Rights Watch (2003:486), the U.S. African community was split 
on the Sudan issue until Louis Farrakhan “faded out of the debate” due to illness in the 
late 1990s. Farrakhan, head of the organization “Nation of Islam”, was a strong 
defender of the Islamist government in Khartoum, and had considerable clout over the 
debate on the issue among Afro-American organizations.43 Allen D. Hertzke 
(2004:253) suggests black leaders like Jesse Jackson remained silent on Sudan for fear 
of offending Muslim allies. The fact that the Sudan had become a “Christian Right 
issue” also made it difficult for Afro-American organizations to join the campaign. 
African Americans are not less religious than white Americans, but there are deep 
historical cleavages between white and black churches. According to expert on 
religion and politics John Green (2007) at Pew Forum, “one of the biggest divisions in 
American religion is on race. Many researchers like to think of black churches as a 
separate religious tradition, even though the theology is the same. Many evangelicals 
have worked very hard to disavow racism, but the divisions are still there”.   
 
 
42 According to a press release from the State Departement: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/3645.htm. 
43 The background article ”Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam on Slavery in the Sudan “ on the Anti-Defamation 
League’s web page contains references to the many news stories on the issue in American press: 
http://www.adl.org/issue_nation_of_islam/farrakhan_and_slavery_in_sudan.asp 
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“In the early phases of the Sudan campaign black support was limited to disparate 
leaders”, Hertzke (2004:253) writes. Among these disparate leaders was Congressman 
Donald Payne (Democrat from New Jersey). He was among the activists arrested in a 
protest outside the Sudanese embassy in the spring of 2001 (Reynolds 2001), and he 
later introduced the final version of the Sudan Peace Act in Congress. In 2001, Al 
Sharpton and Jesse Jackson, both previous presidential contenders, both made trips to 
Sudan. At this point, Sudan had become a hot topic among Afro-Americans as well. 
“This has the possibility of becoming a new South-Africa”, one staffer for a black 
congressman told the newsletter Africa Confidential (2001). Chuck Singleton, pastor 
of the largest African-American congregation in California was another leader on the 
issue. In 1999, he explained the lack of attention to Sudan from black leaders with the 
fact that they were too busy with other issues. “So to call their attention to and get 
them to change directions or add another agenda item is a very difficult thing to do,” 
Singleton said (Bearden 1999). 
 
In early 2001, Sudan activists like Payne and Singleton did succeed in bringing elite 
organizations like National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), Urban League, and the Congressional Black Caucus into the faith-based 
campaign network for Sudan. This added considerable strength to the campaign, and 
seems to underline religious historian Leo P. Ribuffo’s point that “religious interest 
groups have been most effective when they found allies outside their own communities 
and invoked widely shared American values” (Ribuffo 2001:21).44
 
4.3.3.2 Explanation 2: Human rights group lobbying 
Christian conservatives were by no means the first to introduce Sudan as an issue in 
U.S. civil society. But they seem to have been about the first to highlight the religious 
 
44 This again resonates with criteria three and nine: Policies ought to be backed by the larger public, and the 
lobbyists need to have the ability to build broad coalitions. 
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dimension of the civil war in Sudan. Human Rights Watch (HRW 1993) did issue a 
report on the Christian minority of the Copts years before Sudan entered the Christian-
conservative radar screen. Since the Islamists seized power in Khartoum in 1989, 
HRW had issued regular reports on the civil war in Sudan. But apart from the report 
on the Copts, only one other underlined the religious aspects of the conflict 
specifically (HRW 1994). The same goes for Amnesty International. Their annual 
reports document massive human rights abuses, including mass killings of civilians in 
Southern Sudan all through the 1990s. But a review of all of their annual reports since 
1995 indicates that the conflict is not framed as a religious struggle, or genocide of 
Christians. An electronic search through the reports shows that abbreviations of the 
word “Christian” is only mentioned once in eleven reports (in a description of an 
episode inside a Church in 2002). The word “religious” is mentioned three times, but 
not as a description of the conflict.45 Neither do the traditional, mainline 
denominations seem to have played any significant role in getting Sudan on the map of 
U.S. concerns. “Sudan has been a frustration. We have not put enough energy into it, 
and I don’t think we have been as persistent and public as the crisis 
demanded,”presiding bishop Mark S. Hanson of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
America (ECLA) admitted in a personal interview.46  
 
These arguments all support the claim of the Christian-conservative activists that an 
emphasis on the religious elements of the conflict was missing (Horowitz 2007, 
McDonnell 2007). Said William Saunders of the Family Research Council:  “Very, 
very few knew about Sudan in the mid-90s. We were concerned that mainstream 
human rights groups did not pay sufficient attention because of the religious element 
of the conflict.” 
 
45 Reports accessed on http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/sudan/reports.do 
46 Despite the name, ECLA is not evangelical in the sense that the term is used generally, and in this thesis. 
ECLA is a theologically liberal denomination. In fact, Hanson told in the interview that one of his great 
frustrations has been that the term evangelical has been “taken away” from his church and reserved for 
conservatives. 
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The framing of the civil war in Sudan in religious terms might be one explanation why 
the religiously conservative campaign caught the attention of the Bush-administration. 
Another might be that theirs was a campaign in a more profound sense of the word 
than the activity of traditional groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty. 
Although the latter groups were concerned by abuses in Sudan as well, neither of them 
made Sudan a special priority over other countries with similar abuses. In fact, Human 
Rights Watch’s executive director Kenneth Roth had criticized the faith-based 
campaign against religious persecution in the 90s as “special pleading” and “an effort 
to privilege certain classes of victims” (Freedman 1997). This enraged campaign 
strategist Michael Horowitz, who tried to get Roth fired by sending letters to board 
members of HRW and stepping up public criticism of Roth (ibid). There were, in other 
words, both personal and political antagonisms making it hard for liberal and faith-
based activists to cooperate on Sudan.  
 
Reading through op-eds in major newspapers and academic literature on U.S. Sudan 
policy made it clear that public campaigning for Sudan in the late 90s to a large degree 
was done by faith-based groups, not the traditional secular human rights groups. The 
personal interviews confirmed this impression. David Smock at the U.S. Institute of 
Peace and Colin Thomas-Jensen at the International Crisis Group both worked 
intimately with Sudan in the late 90s for secular groups. Both named religious 
conservatives as the primary reason why the Bush administration got involved in 
Sudan. According to Thomas Jensen (2007), “Bush came under pressure from his 
base.” Smock (2007) calls evangelicals “Bush’s natural constituency – and he listened 
to them.” This might also have a structural explanation: Although rich in topical and 
political expertise, organizations like HRW and Amnesty do not have the same 
organizational grassroots strength as evangelical groups. Amnesty International USA 
represents 300.000 members. National Association of Evangelicals represents 30 
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million.47 Furthermore, while evangelicals according to Robert Putnam (2000:159) 
have built up some of the strongest grassroots movements in the United States over the 
past few decades, organizations like Amnesty have developed from grassroots 
organizations into “participation-by-proxy” organizations, where the connections 
between paid activists in Washington DC and paying members are increasingly weak. 
 
Nevertheless, four secular initiatives for Sudan need mentioning in order to paint a 
complete picture of the Sudan activism in the United States around 2000-01: First, at 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a “Task Force on U.S.-Sudan 
Policy” was established in July 2000 in order to “revitalize” the debate on Sudan in the 
U.S. and generate “pragmatic recommendations for the new administration (CSIS 
2001:1). This task force was in part a reaction to the strong Sudan activism among 
U.S. evangelicals and others. People like Walter H. Kansteiner III, who was to become 
Undersecretary of State for African Affairs in the Bush-administration, and Elliott 
Abrams participated in the task force, and its recommendations were to be influential 
on the new administration.48 Secondly, similar activities had been ongoing at the U.S. 
Institute of Peace (USIP) throughout the 1990s, under the auspices of Chester A. 
Crocker, who was President Bush’s first choice as special envoy to Sudan in 2001, but 
who declined the job (Woodward 2006:121). The report “A new Approach to Peace in 
Sudan” (USIP 1999) triggered a State Department conference where ideas for renewed 
engagement were discussed (Woodward 2006:120). Thirdly, there was also an 
established “Sudan Working Group”, which consisted of several liberal church groups 
and cooperated closely with Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. This 
group also produced several policy papers on Sudan and wrote letters to the Clinton 
 
47 Numbers taken from the organizations’ web pages: 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/activist_toolkit/startagroup/startalocalgroup.html and 
http://www.nae.net/index.cfm?FUSEACTION=nae.benefits 
48 The influence of these institutions will be discussed further in the analysis of U.S. policy towards Sudan. 
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administration.49 And lastly, the International Crisis Group did continuous 
campaigning on Sudan, particularly through its Africa expert John Prendergast, who 
also worked on Sudan in the State Departement during the Clinton administration.  
 
4.3.3.3 Explanation 3: Result of personal convictions 
So far, the entire analysis has rested on the assumption that domestic policy concerns 
influence foreign policy decisions. Although not an uncommon assumption, neither is 
it an uncontroversial one. It is difficult to prove a causal relationship between the 
actions of domestic lobby groups and foreign policy decision-makers. Another 
question is whether these relations are best described as causal. An increasing line of 
scholarly works investigates foreign policy decisions in terms of so-called constitutive 
relations rather than causal (Ruggie 1998). Within these various social constructivist 
perspectives the main argument is that decisions must be considered in light of 
decision-makers’ identity: How they view reality. Instead of speaking of Christian-
conservative lobbying, one may speak of a Christian-conservative discourse which is 
part of the constituting of the decision-makers’ worldview (Scholz 2005).  
 
The vast majority of the works dealing with religion and foreign policy-making in the 
Bush-administration seem to be drawing on this theoretical perspective to varying 
degrees, even though few of the authors label themselves constructivists or discuss 
constructivist theory directly. Instead of discussing the causal influence on religious 
ideas and interest groups, their primary interest is looking at President Bush’s personal 
faith as an explanation for his actions (Aikman 2004, Albright 2006, Bacevich and 
Prodromou 2004, Goodstein 2004, Judis 2005, Mansfield 2003, Smith 2006, Suskind 
2004). One example is Andrew J. Bacevich and Elizabeth H. Prodromou’s (2004) 
article “God is Not Neutral: Religion and Foreign Policy after 9/11”, which opens with 
 
49 Samples of the campaigning may be found at the campaign’s news site http://sudaninfonet.tripod.com/ and at 
the homepage of the Episcopalian “Washington Office on Africa” web page http://www.woaafrica.org/. 
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the following statement: “George W. Bush is a man of genuine religious conviction. 
Since September 11, 2001, his personal religiosity has had a marked effect on U.S. 
foreign policy.” Their conclusion is that the president’s religion informed his alliance 
with neoconservative thinkers and “may well ensure the dominance of neoconservative 
precepts in U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future” (ibid:54). Another 
widespread conclusion is that Bush’s personal faith infuses him with certitude, not to 
say stubbornness, when pursuing his personal goals. “He truly believes he’s on a 
mission from God. Absolute faith like that overwhelms a need for analysis”, 
Republican columnist Bruce Bartlett claims in Ron Suskind’s (2004:1) analysis titled 
“Without a Doubt”. 
 
It is no wonder Bush’s personal faith fascinates journalists and researchers. His own 
speeches and remarks are full of references to the United States being “called” or 
given a “mission” by the “Author of Liberty” or “Maker of Heaven”. As are speeches 
of every American president throughout all times. Abraham Lincoln spoke of being 
“an humble instrument in the hands of the Almighty, and of this his almost chosen 
people” (Smith 2006:91); and Franklin D. Roosevelt declared during World War II 
that “we on our side are striving to be true to [our] divine heritage” (Judis 2005:1). 
This makes it difficult to make strong conclusions on the influence of Bush’s personal 
faith by reading his speeches. He is perhaps not as much exposing his personal faith as 
continuing a rhetorical tradition as old as the republic. And even if personal faith does 
affect Bush’s foreign policy, this faith is not an intrinsic force in Bush’s mind alone. 
Whether the relationship is causal or constitutive, there seems to be a strong argument 
that the implementation of Bush’s faith is influenced by groups with whom he shares a 
basic religious world-view and whom he considers to be close allies and even personal 
friends. “Due to personal connections he had, Bush became personally interested in the 
issue [of Sudan],” Faith McDonnell (2007) believes. According to campaign leader 
Nina Shea, the president’s wife Laura also expressed personal interest in Sudan when 
Shea was talking to the president about the issue at a White House event in 2002. Shea 
later learned that Laura Bush’s mother had attended several meetings on Sudan in her 
church in Midland, which was one of the most active on the issue (Neumayr 2003). 
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Special Envoy John Danforth has told National Review that “not only did the president 
appoint me as special envoy, he repeatedly talked to me about Sudan afterward. Every 
single time I went to either Sudan or Kenya for peace talks, I talked to the president in 
advance, either in the Oval Office or by telephone – every time. He was intimately 
involved in it” (Nordlinger 2005). In his autobiography, Danforth (2006:189) suggests 
that Bush had another motivation for engaging in Sudan: “President Bush saw the 
prospect of peace in Sudan as a possible model for resolving ethnic and religious 
conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere. As the president once said to me, “If they 
[the Sudanese] can figure it out, anyone can””.50
 
The sources of Bush’s personal convictions do not necessarily stem from pressure 
from religious interest groups. One might have to look wider than election benefits and 
strategic calculations. In constructivist language: In order to understand the 
relationship between identities and foreign policy, one need to look at multiple forms 
of texts. This may even include movies: In 2005, several media reported that one of 
the three movies President Bush watched during the three first month of the year was 
Hotel Rwanda, a dramatization of the genocide in Rwanda (Bumiller 2005, Nordlinger 
2005). Bush saw the movie twice, and invited the hotel manager the story was based 
on, Paul Rusesabagina, to the White House afterwards. They talked about Darfur, and 
Bush said he would do anything he could to stop what he believed was a new 
genocide. Bush’s intervention in the (perceived) genocide in Sudan may at least partly 
be a result of a similar ‘never again’-instinct. The phrase ‘never again’ has strong 
resonance in what Samantha Power (2002:xxi) has called America’s “culture of 
Holocaust awareness.” But as Power’s study ““A Problem from Hell": America and 
the Age of Genocide (ibid) shows, this culture does not seem to have spurred the 
United States into acting forcefully against genocide at any time in the 20th century.  
  
 
50 This is consistent with what observers call Bush's ideals of a "humble" foreign policy; ideals he brought to 
office, but largely disposed of after September 11, 2001 (Melby 2004).  
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Bush saw Hotel Rwanda in 2005, four years after he got involved in Sudan, and there 
are no indications that a book or a film prompted President Bush into becoming 
interested in Sudan in the first place.51 But the story illustrates how convictions may 
be shaped by many different impressions, be it lobbyism, family talk or watching 
movies. 
 
4.3.3.4 Explanation 4: National interest 
Classic realism, the belief that countries are driven by interest and the quest for power 
rather than ideals and benevolence, is according to Walter Russell Mead (2002:35-55) 
a foreign policy model designed to describe the European power play in the nineteenth 
century, and as such no fruitful starting point for a study of American foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, whether labeled realism or Hamiltonianism (as Mead calls it); interests 
matter, and in order to understand U.S. policies towards Sudan – including the 
decision to work for a peace agreement – one need to consider U.S. interests in Sudan. 
As Mohammed E. Ahrari underlines, the most important determinant of lobby 
influence on foreign policy, is perhaps whether the issue pushed for is in line with U.S. 
strategic interests or not (criterion one).  
 
Sudan has never been a country of great national interest to the United States, neither 
economically, nor strategically. At the time President Bush came into office, there 
were however two areas where Sudan was of some economic interest to interest 
groups in the United States: Gum Arabic and oil. Gum Arabic is a derivative of the 
acacia tree, a natural substance which is required in the production of newspapers (in 
printers), soft drinks (like Coca Cola) and pharmaceuticals. Sudan provides 70 to 90 
percent of the world’s supply; and in the 1990s, the United States imported almost all 
of its gum Arabic from the country (Kim 1998). When trade sanctions were imposed 
 
51 However, William Saunders (2007) of the Family Reseach Concil told that he first learned about the war in 
Sudan through a couple of TV-programs. Faith McDonnell (2007) first heard about the conflict from the 
journalist David Aikman (who has also written a biography on President Bush’s faith). 
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on Sudan in 1997, an exception was made for gum Arabic after lobbying from groups 
like the Newspaper Association of America (representing among others the 
Washington Post), the National Soft Drink Association (Coca Cola etc.), the National 
Food Processors Association, and the Nonprescription Drug Manufacturers 
Association (Sudan Update 1997, Washington Post 1997).  These lobbies did have 
diverging interests to the faith-based activists. While conservative Christians wanted to 
isolate Khartoum (‘the Hitler regime of our time’), the gum Arabic lobby wanted a 
better relationship with the regime. This conflict did play a role when Congress later 
on discussed strengthening the sanctions against Khartoum. But it seems unlikely that 
the need for gum Arabic was a barrier for engaging more deeply in the peace process 
in Sudan. Quite the opposite: A more stable situation in Sudan was also in the interest 
of the soft drink and printing industry in the U.S, and the need for gum Arabic does 
not seem to have played any role in the discussion on whether the U.S. should engage 
in a peace process.  
 
Another economic interest was soon to become much more important than gum 
Arabic: Oil. Large quantities of oil were found in the south of Sudan in the early 
1990s, and this was probably a main reason why the civil war escalated at the same 
time (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2001:4-5). The regime in 
Khartoum seized control over the oil fields and cut deals with Western and Asian 
firms, mainly from Australia, Malaysia, China and Canada, to extract the oil. No U.S. 
companies were directly involved in this new oil boom, but U.S. investors were 
involved in several of the companies (Washington Office on Africa 1999). As with the 
gum Arabic lobby, these companies lobbied for the United States to better their 
relationship to Khartoum. An argument could therefore be made that the United States 
had a strategic interest in favoring Khartoum over the South in order to gain access to 
the potential oil riches in Sudan, and that engaging in a peace process that could 
strengthen the South would risk endanger American interests (Martin 1999). This 
argument is, however, weakened by the fact that the oil discoveries in Sudan were 
small compared to other oil riches on the African continent. In 1999, Sudan’s known 
reserves only ranked tenth among African countries, and the reserves of 36 million 
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tons were dwarfed by Libya’s 3.900 and Nigeria’s 3.000 million ton.52 Furthermore, 
an argument could also be made that in order to secure future oil revenues, it would be 
in the interest of both Khartoum and the United States to stabilize the situation in the 
oil-producing areas on the border between the north and the south in order to bring in 
new investments and explore new areas (Woodward 2006:119). A peace deal could be 
seen as being in the strategic interest of the U.S. in order to secure future oil supplies.   
 
Economic interest in gum Arabic and oil seem to be more important in the discussion 
on the substance of U.S. policy towards Sudan – especially in Congress – not in the 
discussion on whether the Bush-administration should get involved in brokering a 
peace agreement in the first place. None of the persons interviewed for this thesis 
mentioned oil or gum Arabic as part of the initial policy rationale behind the Bush 
administration’s Sudan policy. The same conclusion seems fair if one looks at U.S. 
security interests in Sudan. These were mainly concentrated around the issue of 
terrorism, which seems to have been the main driver behind U.S. policy towards Sudan 
since the Cold War. In the 1990s, the U.S. had imposed sanctions on Sudan, barred the 
country from entering the UN Security Council, and even bombed Sudan as a part of 
its counter-terrorist policies. In general, terrorism seems to have been the guiding 
principle behind the strategic views on Africa of the Bush-administration as well. A 
policy document from the White House states, “In Africa, promise and opportunity sit 
side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value 
of the United States — preserving human dignity — and our strategic priority — 
combating global terror.”53 Still, it is hard to find any indications in early statements 
from the Bush-administration that engaging in the peace process in Sudan was 
considered as part of a strategy against terrorism. When asked about Africa in his first 
hearing at the House International Relations Committee, Colin Powell (2001:30) stated 
 
52 Numbers taken from World Energy Council’s “Survey of Energy Resources 2001”: 
http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/publications/reports/ser/oil/oil.asp 
53 Quote taken from the online document ”Africa Policy” on http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/africa/ 
[accessed 29.01.2007]. 
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that “Africa would be a priority for President Bush and me; not necessarily a military 
or national security priority, but just a priority in the sense that this is a continent of 
800.000.000 people who have great needs, and those needs can be satisfied in many 
ways by United States action and United States effort”. David Smock (2007) at the 
USIP made a similar point: “Counter-terrorism was not a driving force behind policies 
in Sudan. It is clearly very much the driving force behind recent policies in Somalia, 
but this was not the case for Sudan.” 
 
Engaging more deeply in Sudan was perhaps not important to U.S. strategic interests 
in 2001. On the other hand it is hard to see that it should be against strategic interests 
to work for peace. The conclusion of the CSIS task force in February 2001 was that 
the approach of the Clinton administration – isolation of Khartoum combined with 
tough rhetoric – had made little headway in stopping Khartoum’s support of 
international terrorism. “If the Bush administration is to be effective in advancing U.S. 
interests in Sudan, it will need a significantly modified approach,” the task force 
recommended (CSIS 2001:5). One could therefore argue that there was little risk in 
engaging in peacekeeping in 2001. In U.S. Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, 
Peter Woodward (2006:117) argues that changes on the ground made conditions look 
“ripe for resolution” as the Bush administration reviewed its policies in the summer of 
2001. These conditions were first of all the military situation; the fact that neither side 
in the civil war seemed capable of a military victory. This was matched by a lack of 
political advance on either side which made the leaderships weaker both in north and 
south. At the same time, the repeated attempts to produce a peace settlement in the 
past had created some common ground from which to launch a new diplomatic 
offensive. Finally, the regime in Khartoum had approached Washington DC several 
times and offered terrorist intelligence in the final years of the Clinton administration. 
Although this did not change official U.S. policy towards Sudan, American agents 
made their first visit to Khartoum to exchange material in May 2000.  
 
All of this meant that the climate in Washington had been changing even before the 
arrival of the Bush administration, and as Colin Powell ordered a review of Sudan 
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policy in the spring of 2001, both officials in State departments and policy advisors 
were positive to a deeper engagement for peace.  
 
4.4 Second aspect: U.S. policy substance 
Getting someone’s attention to an issue is just the first step on the way to influencing 
their position. This section examines the content of United States policies towards 
Sudan from the summer of 2001, when the Bush administration’s new policy was 
presented, up until January 2005, when a peace agreement was signed between the 
government in Khartoum and the southern rebels. To what degree did the Bush 
administration follow the policy recommendations of religious conservatives? And 
secondly, to what degree did Congress adopt the policy recommendations of these 
groups, and did the input of Congress influence the administration’s policies? 
Establishing such links, if there are any, does not mean proving a causal relationship 
between the policy inputs of pressure groups and the administrations’ policies. But if 
there is little or no correlation, there can hardly be any influence in terms of policy 
substance. 
 
4.4.1 Executive policies  
To determine what religious conservative pressure groups wanted Bush to do in Sudan 
is not entirely straightforward. Religious conservatives were not a monolithic group. 
Plenty of recommendations were made, by plenty of people. But as this analysis has 
tried to establish, some people were more central than others, and one gets a good idea 
of religious conservatives’ views by looking at the statements of some of the most 
central actors.  
 
There seems to be one central theme in religious conservatives’ opinions on Sudan: 
Stay tough on Khartoum. “The United States needs a strong non-military policy to stop 
the genocide in Sudan – a policy to keep the pressure on Khartoum by publicizing 
Sudan’s atrocities and isolating the regime until the carnage, slavery, rape and 
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deliberate mass starvation stop,” the policy declaration on the Sudan Campaign’s web 
page reads (Sudan Campaign 2000). One may argue that isolation of Khartoum was 
exactly what the Clinton administration did. But according to the campaign, the failure 
was that Clinton implemented this policy “half-heartedly” (ibid): “U.S. foreign policy 
towards the government of Sudan must be pursued with unwavering firmness and 
promoted as a policy priority” was the central campaign message (ibid). The same 
message is evident when one looks at the recommendations given at a hearing on U.S. 
Sudan policy in Congress in the spring of 2001, called “America’s Sudan Policy: A 
New Direction?” This hearing is a fitting illustration of policy views, since it was held 
just as the Bush administration was reviewing its Sudan policy, and was the only 
official outlet of opinion from civil society towards the legislature. Campaigners like 
professor Eric Reeves, Roger Winter of the U.S. Committee for Refugees and reverend 
Gary Kusonoki were all active in the Sudan campaign, and they all presented the same 
message, with the words of Kusonoki (2001:59): “We should treat Sudan as a pariah 
nation, just as we treated South Africa years ago.” 
 
To be fair, religious conservatives made more detailed and nuanced policy proposals 
as well. Elliot Abrams (2001b), who was to become responsible for Sudan at the 
National Security Council in the Bush administration, made three policy 
recommendations in his article “What to Do About Sudan?” in The Weekly Standard 
just weeks before his appointment: First of all, appoint a special envoy with full access 
to the president. Secondly, conduct the new diplomatic offensive through the existing 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). And thirdly, consider severe 
sanctions against Khartoum if the regime does not respond to the carrots of peace 
negotiations. These recommendations seem to have been supported by most 
campaigners. But the bottom line, both for Abrams and most other campaigners, seems 
to have been a deep distrust of the Islamist government in Khartoum. As Nina Shea 
(1998) stated back in the late 90s: “Negotiations with the genocidal dictatorship (…) 
will not achieve either justice or a lasting peace.” 
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Yet negotiations were exactly what the Bush administration attempted. Instead of 
staying tough, the Bush administration decided to stay in touch with Khartoum. U.S. 
policy objectives were summed up in several speeches and hearing statements by 
Walter Kansteiner (2002a, 2002b, 2002c), Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at 
the State Department. The objectives were threefold: First, a negotiated peace 
settlement between north and south. Secondly, cooperation against terrorism from the 
government in Khartoum. And thirdly, getting humanitarian assistance to all those in 
need in Sudan. This meant engaging Khartoum in talks on all three issues.  
 
For religious conservatives, Kansteiner represented “the voice of capitulation” on 
Sudan (Hertzke 2004:286). Activist Eric Reeves wrote op-eds on Kansteiner’s 
“shallow and ineffectual” leadership in the State Department, which he called the 
“deepest shame for the Africa Bureau” (quoted ibid). Still, it was this “voice of 
capitulation” that won through in the administration, against the more hardline 
approach of Elliot Abrams in the National Security Council or Roger Winter and 
Andrew Natsios in USAID (ibid.). Special envoy John Danforth (2006:193) 
summarizes the contrast between the policy input of religious conservatives and the 
administration’s policy in clear terms in his autobiography: “My understanding of the 
mission President Bush gave me differed from the expectations of concerned 
American Christians.” Danforth describes how religious conservatives, especially in 
Congress, emphasized how the government in Khartoum was the oppressor and the 
southern Sudanese the victims. He concludes: “I did not doubt this observation, but I 
did not think it relevant to my mission. As I understood it, President Bush had asked 
me to see if America could be a peacemaker. He did not ask me to be the moral arbiter 
between the two sides.”  
 
Religious conservatives got things their way on some issues: After all, they pressured 
hard to get a special envoy, and to get John Danforth instead of Chester Crocker. They 
pressured hard to get direct aid deliveries to southern Sudan without Khartoum’s 
restrictions (McDonnell 2007), and this became the third policy priority of the 
administration. And the issue of slavery, one of the initial concerns of the activists, 
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was made one of the four tests special envoy Danforth presented to test Khartoum’s 
seriousness in the negotiations: An international commission was set up to look into 
the allegations of slavery (Woodward 2006:122). But the administration’s overarching 
policy move remained offering Khartoum carrots like international recognition and an 
end to UN sanctions in return for peace negotiations and terror cooperation. This was 
against the will of most religious conservatives. When asked about this paradox in a 
personal interview, William Saunders at the Family Research Council simply 
answered: “The administration’s approach worked.” He admitted his campaign wanted 
the administration to be much more aggressive towards Khartoum. “But there are 
probably a million different ways to go about doing something. This approach 
worked” (Saunders 2007). Secular observer David Smock (2007) was categorical in 
his assessment of the religious conservatives’ policy inputs: “Evangelicals were not 
helpful in creating policy proposals.”  
 
What then, explains the administration’s approach? One obvious candidate is 9/11. 
The terror attacks on the U.S. occurred five days after John Danforth was appointed 
special envoy. Khartoum was quick to offer full cooperation on terrorism in the 
following days, providing lists and information on terror suspects. "The attacks of 9/11 
may not have changed everything, but they did scare Sudan's government into seeking 
improved relations with Washington. Suddenly, Bashir [the leader in Khartoum] 
started to be helpful on terrorism and also to negotiate productively, albeit unhurriedly, 
with Garang [the rebel leader]," Madeleine Albright (2006:256) states in her memoirs 
from the period. Albright (ibid:255) says she believes she did everything she could to 
end the war in Sudan. In her view, it was 9/11 - not the new administration - that 
changed the picture. Cooperation on terrorism was well underway with the Clinton 
administration before 9/11 as well (Katzman 2001:28). But the cooperation gained a 
much higher priority with the terror attack, both for Khartoum and Washington DC. 
“9/11 injected a degree of urgency into our counter-terrorism cooperation with 
Khartoum. (…) I can with confidence characterize their current cooperation as 
acceptable,” Walter Kansteiner III (2002b) told Congress in the summer of 2002.  
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For John Danforth (2006:194), it was a goal not to make "moral proclamations” 
against Khartoum. Danforth says he promised the Sudanese foreign minister “normal 
relations” between Sudan and the United States on behalf of President Bush 
personally. “I am convinced that the response of President Bush was a critical factor in 
persuading the government of Sudan to make the concessions that led to the peace 
agreement signed by the parties in January 2005,” Danforth (ibid:195) concludes. 
Several factors contributed to that agreement, and not all of them can be attributed to 
the United States. But according to several observers, the peace deal would never have 
been sealed if the United States had not brought such leverage to the process (Smock 
2007, Thomas-Jensen 2007, Vraalsen 2005:79, Woodward 2006:132). It is also worth 
noting that several of the policy proposals the U.S. brought into the process were 
tabled in the working groups at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Most important among these was the one 
state-solution that was to be the central element of the agreement. “I do hope we were 
helpful,” David Smock (2007) said in a personal interview, and added that the 
negotiating parties told him that some of his institute’s ideas were generated into peace 
process. Michael Horowitz scornfully dismissed the work of CSIS as “appeasement” 
and labeled the think thank “the constructive engagement crowd” (quoted in Hertzke 
2004:267). Although meant as an insult, constructive engagement with Khartoum 
proved to be crucial in ending the world’s longest civil war. 
 
4.4.2 Legislative policies 
Even though foreign policy is primarily a presidential prerogative, the bulk of the 
campaigning on Sudan was directed at Congress. “We worked very hard, and visited 
the Hill again and again,” Richard Cizik (2007) of the National Association of 
Evangelicals (NAE) explained when asked about describing the key to the success of 
the Sudan campaign. But why Capitol Hill, and not the White House? “Because unless 
you can put a bill on the President's desk, you're dependent on the President's whims,” 
Cizik answered. 
 
 66
 
                                             
As noted in chapter three, lawmaking is one of the ways Congress may influence 
foreign policy, and the bill Cizik is talking about on this subject matter is The Sudan 
Peace Act.54 The bill was a baby of the religious conservative campaign; in fact 
Michael Horowitz (2007) at Hudson claimed he drafted the entire bill himself.55 It was 
crafted as a reaction to the oil boom in Sudan in the late 1990s, which gave the regime 
in Khartoum new resources to wage war on the south. The idea behind the law was to 
put more pressure on Khartoum, and among the provisions were capital market 
sanctions to keep companies that invested in Sudan (like Australian Talisman Oil and 
Swedish Lundin Oil) out of American capital markets. The sanctions were first 
presented in 1999 by a coalition of religious conservatives and national security hawks 
who wanted to put extra pressure on Khartoum for counter-terrorism reasons (Hertzke 
2004:281). Later, the semi-official Commission on International Religious Freedom 
and Elliot Abrams picked up on the idea, before Congressman Spencer Bachus (a 
Republican from Alabama) included it as the “Bachus amendment” to the proposed 
Sudan Peace Act in the spring of 2001. After 9/11 the amendment was fiercely 
contested both by the Bush administration and leading senators who wanted to better 
the relations to Khartoum. In the end, the administration pressed Congress to suspend 
the entire bill and contribute to lifting UN sanctions on Sudan as a reward for the 
cooperation on terrorism instead (Woodward 2006:128). 
 
It was not until October 21, 2002 that a final Sudan Peace Act was signed into law by 
President Bush. This act was considerably toned down from the first draft, but still 
provided new means to maintain pressure on Khartoum in the ongoing peace 
negotiations: The President was asked to report after six months whether Khartoum 
negotiated in “good faith” or “unreasonably interfered with humanitarian assistance 
efforts” (Sudan Peace Act 2002:5). If Khartoum was found to obstruct the 
 
54 Bills have been the religious conservatives’ main weapons on other subject matters as well, from the 
International Religious Freedom Act to the North Korea Human Rights Act. 
55 As previous quotes suggest (”Debbie and I made peace in Sudan”), Horowitz’s claims should be treated with 
caution, however.  
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negotiations, a number of sanctions would be imposed, including denied access to 
World Bank and IMF loans and a UN embargo against the Sudanese government. 
 
“I will not forget Sudan,” President Bush promised when he signed the Sudan Peace 
Act into law (Hertzke 2004:292). And in what Allen Hertzke (ibid) considers an 
acknowledgement of the power of the faith-based campaign movement, Bush added: 
“And if I do, I know that you will prod me.” At the same time, in the official press 
release issued by the White House, the president underlines that foreign policy is his 
domain, no matter what is stated in a bill from Congress: “The executive branch shall 
construe these provisions as advisory because such provisions, if construed as 
mandatory, would impermissibly interfere with the President's exercise of his 
constitutional authorities to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs” (Bush 2002). 
 
So, did the law influence U.S. policy on Sudan? As noted in the theory chapter, it is 
questionable how much influence Congress has on foreign policy in general. 
Congress’ “impact on the actual diplomatic behaviour of the United States is often 
minimal”, Crabb et.al. (2000:138) claim. In this case, it is hard to conclude decisively 
on the impact. President Bush did report to Congress on the negotiations in April 2003 
as the law required. He certified that Khartoum did in fact negotiate “in good faith”, 
even though their forces continued to attack civilians in spite of a signed cease-fire 
(Reeves 2003). This provoked massive outcry from religious conservatives, but the 
administration did not change their assessment no matter how fierce the protests were 
(Hertzke 2004:295-296). Still. Allen Hertzke claims that the “fierce lobbying by Sudan 
coalition members” with the Sudan Peace Act as main weapon was vital in keeping the 
pressure on Khartoum in the final phases of the peace negotiations. Other analysts 
support this view (Smock 2007, Woodward 2006:130). “Bush was pursuing a 
constructive engagement where Clinton had been containing and isolating. Bush’s 
contention was: If you put enough incentives on the table, Khartoum would turn. 
Congress used the Sudan Peace Act as a stick to compensate for Bush's carrots, and 
probably the combination of the two was decisive,” Colin Thomas-Jensen (2007) 
concluded. 
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5 Conclusion 
5.1 Attention, not substance 
“You never know if you influence someone, or if he just agrees with you,” Richard 
Land (2007) of the Southern Baptist Convention replied when asked about evangelical 
influence on President Bush’s policy towards Sudan. Though measuring influence has 
its intrinsic difficulties, some scholars do not shy away from making clear-cut 
conclusions: “The faith-based movement has bent the arc of Sudanese history,” Allen 
Hertzke (2004:299) emphatically claims in his account on the religious conservative 
campaigning for persecuted Christians in Sudan. My analysis suggests that his claim is 
somewhat hyperbolic. Had the Bush administration followed the advices of the faith-
based movement on how to conduct peace negotiations in Sudan (stay tough on 
Khartoum), there may never have been a peace agreement. On the other hand, if the 
well-connected faith-based movement had not provided such consistent lobbying, the 
Bush administration would probably not have been heavily involved in peace making 
in Sudan in the first place. Even though personal convictions probably played an 
important role, there seem to be a strong case for religiously conservative influence as 
the primary explanation for the Bush administration’s policy attention. The case is 
weaker in terms of policy substance, even though the Sudan Peace Act may have been 
an important component in the U.S. efforts for peace. Thus, Walter Russell Mead is 
probably right when he claims that “thanks to evangelical pressure, (…) the [United 
States] has led the fight to end Sudan’s wars,” (Mead 2006:38). Evangelical pressure 
explains why the United States got involved in Sudan, but it does not explain why the 
administration fought the way it did once involved.  
 
5.2 Theoretical conclusions 
Looking at the indicators developed in the theory chapter, the shape of Christian-
conservative meddling in foreign affairs seems to be largely consistent with influential 
involvement by ethnic lobbies in the past. Of the ten determinants of a lobby group’s 
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power quotient presented earlier, most are met by this campaign: The group retained 
strong ties to the country lobbied for through missionary groups and Sudanese exiles 
(criterion 2). The campaign for Sudan was backed by a (if not the) larger public 
through evangelical constituencies (3), and as Walter Russell Mead (2005:91) notes, 
“the projection of religious faith and values onto the arena of foreign policy has 
tremendous appeal and resonance for tens of millions of Americans”. Furthermore, the 
campaign had plenty of members and other resources (4); and the plight of Sudanese 
Christians was widely considered a legitimate interest (5), even though secular human 
rights groups did accuse the faith-based groups of ‘special-pleading’ for Christians.  
 
Concerning pressure directed at Congress, we have seen examples of direct 
constituency pressure in the case of the state of Colorado (6); the importance of 
personal access to decision makers through the work of e.g. Bill Frist (7); and an 
ability to take ‘strange bedfellows’ into the coalition in the case of Jewish and Catholic 
groups, plus African Americans (9). Crabb et.al.’s criterion concerning lack of 
competition from groups with conflicting views is not entirely met (8): There was a 
potentially conflicting interest in the case of oil, and there was an active lobby on gum 
Arabic. The gum Arabic lobby’s significance seemed to have faded in importance, 
however, and it is far from obvious that oil interests served as a barrier to involvement 
in the peace process. Finally, although we have seen plenty of examples of direct 
lobbying towards the executive through the personal contacts with President Bush, the 
bulk of lobbying seems to have been directed towards the legislature. Therefore, the 
last criterion (10) is only partially met.  
 
“Wilsonian revival” is the term Walter Russell Mead (2005:88) uses to describe the 
increasing influence of evangelicals on foreign affairs issues. Inspired by President 
Woodrow Wilson, Mead labels ‘Wilsonian’ the idea that there is a vital linkage 
between American security and the pursuit of American values of freedom abroad. 
Judging from the description of the faith-based campaign for Sudan presented here, 
religious conservatives share this idealistic agenda. As Mead (ibid) notes, there is one 
major difference, however: Whereas the traditional Wilsonians addressed the questions 
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of values primarily in secular terms like freedom and human rights, the ‘born again 
Wilsonians’ have an explicitly religious agenda of religious freedom and religious 
rights.  
 
Although Wilsonian revival may be a fitting description of the Christian-conservative 
lobby movement, U.S. policy substance in this case has looked more like 
Hamiltonianism. As mentioned in the theory chapter, Hamiltonian (named after 
Alexander Hamilton) is the term Mead uses to describe the traditional realist camp in 
American foreign policy thinking. And traditional realist interests like cooperation on 
national security seem to have been just as important as a Wilsonian will to transform 
or even dispose of an authoritarian regime in the case of Sudan. Or, put differently: 
The peace process in Sudan is a case where Hamiltonian (realist) and Wilsonian 
(idealistic) interests merged. As a representative of the Bush administration, 
counterterrorism coordinator Karl Wycoff, put it before the House International 
Relations Committee in 2004: “[A] successful conclusion to the Sudanese peace 
process will help make the region more stable and less vulnerable to terrorists and their 
facilitators” (Wycoff 2004). Before 9/11, Sudan was not very important in terms of 
national security. After 9/11, Mohammed Ahrari’s first and most important power 
determinant was fulfilled (1): The lobby campaign pressed for a policy – a peace deal 
in Sudan – in line with U.S. strategic interests – counterterrorism. A brief look at two 
other cases suggests that evangelical lobby success is less likely when this decisive 
criterion is not met.  
 
Apart from Sudan, the Christian-conservative campaign has been most concerned 
about persecuted Christians in North Korea and China. Modeled after the ‘Helsinki 
Process’ in which human rights were used as leverage for regime change in the Soviet 
Union in the 1970s, the North Korea Human Rights Act (NKHRA) was initiated by 
religious conservatives and passed by Congress in 2004. Its first paragraph stated that 
“it is the sense of Congress that the human rights of North Koreans should remain a 
key element in future negotiations between the United States, North Korea, and other 
concerned parties in Northeast Asia” (NKHRA 2004:4). But when the United States, 
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North Korea and the other parties in the six-party talks signed a “denuclearization 
action plan” in February 2007, human rights were not mentioned at all in the official 
State Department (2007) release. “The State Department is out there to give Kim Jung 
Il ‘peace in our time’. Human rights are not on the table at all, and Helsinki is 
anathema to the State Department,” Michael Horowitz (2007), the author of the bill, 
gloomily commented in a personal interview a few days before the action plan was 
signed. 
 
In the case of North Korea, denuclearization seems to have trumped human rights so 
far. In the case of China, economic interests seem to have been the strongest. In 2000, 
religious conservatives campaigned hard to prevent the Clinton administration from 
granting China permanent normal trading relations because of China’s persecution of 
Christians and other religious minorities. The campaign did not succeed, and China got 
their trading relations. Religious conservatives did celebrate it as a major victory when 
President Bush demanded to give an uncensored speech on religious freedom on his 
state visit to China in 2002 (Hertzke 2004:311). But apart from such largely symbolic 
gestures, conservative Christians have not had much success altering U.S. relations 
with China. In fact, when asked why his people had such success swaying Bush on 
Sudan, Richard Land (2007) of the Southern Baptist Convention simply answered: 
“Because Khartoum is not Beijing.” Then, he elaborated: “We can't intervene 
everywhere. But we have to intervene where we can make a difference.” 
 
5.3 The future of evangelical foreign policy 
U.S. policies towards North Korea and China are obvious cases for further research to 
test Walter Russell Mead’s (2006) claim that “the resent surge in the number and the 
power of evangelicals is recasting the country’s political scene – with dramatic 
implications for foreign policy”. The case of Sudan indicates that there is some truth to 
his claim, although the revival of the Wilsonian camp may be more a supplement than 
a replacement of the Hamiltonian impulses in U.S. foreign policy. What about the 
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future? Can Mead’s thesis, if not a description of the present situation, serve as a 
prediction of future power?  
 
The evangelical moment may already be over in U.S. foreign policy. A first indication 
is that religious conservatives think so themselves. In the interview in February 2007, 
Michael Horowitz expressed concern over what he had seen in the evangelical 
community the last year or two. Mainly because of lack of recognition of their efforts 
in the national press, he said, there had been “a decline in priority and attention given 
to foreign policy issues. Some Christians are reverting back to the default options of 
abortion and gay marriage. Others are going into the politically correct issue of global 
warming,” Horowitz (2007) claimed. In a roundtable on Mead’s Foreign Affairs essay 
in the journal Faith & International Affairs, managing editor of the leading evangelical 
leading newspaper Christianity Today Mark Galli, expressed similar concerns. He 
claimed that evangelicals are only interested in “specific problems that affect specific 
people in specific ways” (Galli 2006:54). Therefore, Galli predicted that evangelicals 
will become less interested in foreign policy when they discover how complex it is. 
According to Galli, Mead is too generous in his description of the role of evangelicals: 
“Both our history and our DNA suggest that these optimistic assessments will not bear 
up. (…) We will continue to have flashes of international genius – like abolition and 
religious freedom – but in all, our unique contribution to the world lies elsewhere” 
(ibid:55).  
 
A second argument against future evangelical influence on foreign policy is 
demographic. Although still the most religious among the world's industrialized 
countries, even Americans are becoming less religious. Overall religious participation 
has declined significantly since the peak in the 1960s (Putnam 2000:70-72). And 
though this general decline has affected traditional denominations the hardest, 
evangelical churches are affected too: “Evangelicals fear the loss of their teenagers” 
the headline of a New York Times article read in October 2006 (Goodstein 2006). It 
cited statistics predicting that only 4 percent of teenagers today will be ‘Bible-
believing adults’ later in life, a sharp decline from 35 percent in the baby-boomer 
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generation and 65 percent of the World War II generation. The statistics had prompted 
the National Association of Evangelicals into adopting a resolution deploring “the 
epidemic of young people leaving the evangelical church” (ibid). 
 
Finally, although considered to have some influence on the Reagan administration, the 
current influence of evangelicals seems closely connected to Bush's personal faith and 
the composition and electoral basis of the Bush administration (Smith 2006). Their 
influence on future administrations is uncertain. Although some republicans claim the 
Grand Old Party has become God’s Own Party (Hedges 2006, Phillips 2006), the 
frontrunner in the upcoming presidential election (as of April 2007), Rudy Giuliani, 
has few if any ties to the evangelical community. David Smock (2007) of the U.S. 
Institute of Peace contended that evangelicals were not a strong force in the 2006 
midterm elections, that a possible Democrat administration will feel “much less 
beholden” to them, and finally that evangelicals “will have much less influence on 
future administrations.” 
 
Nevertheless, it would be premature to write off evangelical influence on U.S. foreign 
policy altogether. The Christian Right has been written off before, when the Moral 
Majority dissolved in the late-80s or when the Christian Coalition’s influence waned in 
the mid-90s. Richard Cizik of the National Association of Evangelicals did not share 
Michael Horowitz’s or Mark Galli’s gloomy predictions of evangelical foreign policy 
activism. “What we are witnessing, is the rise of a new, centrist evangelicalism. An 
activist and internationalist foreign policy that cares about pursuing a role that is not 
arrogant,” Cizik said (2007). Cizik is one of the evangelicals pushing what Michael 
Horowitz called “the politically correct” issue of climate change hardest within the 
evangelical community, and predicted that evangelicals will play a pivotal role in 
turning official U.S. climate policies in the future.56 Policy analyst John Green at Pew 
 
 
56 Among Cizik’s achievements is the ”Evangelical Climate Initiative”, signed by around 80 evangelical leaders 
in January 2006 (available at: http://www.christiansandclimate.org/). On the other hand, around 25 leading 
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Forum agreed with Cizik’s thesis of a more centrist evangelicalism, and predicted that 
the next generation of evangelicals will be more diverse in their policy opinions than 
today’s Christian Right. He also stated “foreign policy concerns are here to stay for 
evangelicals” (Green 2007).  
 
One should probably be more nuanced when interpreting the second argument against 
an evangelical foreign policy future as well. Although belief patterns may be changing, 
the picture is not entirely clear. “Young people have always been less engaged. They 
tend to return to church when they grow older, marry and settle down. And this return 
is higher among evangelicals than mainstream Christians,” John Green (ibid.) pointed 
out. And a 2006 survey from Pew Forum indicates that Americans in general remain 
more supportive of religion’s role in public life today than they did in the 1960s (Pew 
Forum 2006a:1).  
 
Finally, although future presidential administration may not be as receptive to 
evangelicals as the Bush administration has been, it would also be premature to write 
off evangelicals' role in electoral politics. Exit polls from the 2006 elections show that 
so-called ‘value issues’ were considered among the most important for voters in these 
elections as well, as they were in 2004 (CNN 2006). And the religious divide between 
Republican and Democratic voters, the so-called “God Gap”, persisted: White 
evangelicals and those who attend church frequently continued to support Republicans 
by large margins and remained the party’s most loyal voters (Pew Forum 2006c). This 
means a future Republican president will have to take evangelicals into account. And 
should a Democrat reach the White House in 2008 or later, the self-proclaimed 
evangelical center is ready to influence them. Richard Cizik (2007) told how he had 
approached both presidential frontrunners Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama almost a 
year before the Democratic primaries to discuss religious persecution and other foreign 
 
evangelical leaders in March 2007 called for Cizik to resign for being to activist on climate change issues (Banks 
2007). 
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policy issues with them. Although their future influence might be uncertain, it seems 
certain that evangelicals have come to stay as a source of influence on the foreign 
policy of the United States. 
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